Indies, America 34.

THE

Intereſt of GREAT BRITAIN,

WITH REGARD TO HER

AMERICAN COLONIES,

CONSIDERED.

[PRICE HALF A CROWN.]

1782

THE

INTEREST OF GREAT-BRITAIN

WITH REGARD TO HER

AMERICAN COLONIES,

CONSIDERED.

TO WHICH IS ADDED

AN APPENDIX,

CONTAINING THE OUTLINES OF A PLAN FOR A GENERAL PACIFICATION.

BY JAMES ANDERSON, M.A.

AUTHOR OF OBSERVATIONS ON THE MEANS OF EXCITING A SPIRIT OF NATIONAL INDUSTRY, &c.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND.

M. DCC. LXXXII.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Author of the following Pages living in a remote Corner of the Country, wrote under the Diſadvantage of not having ready Acceſs to Books. On this Account he had not an Opportunity of obtaining a GREAT VARIETY of corroborative facts, nor of drawing thoſe he has employed on all Occaſions from the Originals; on ſome Occaſions he has even been obliged to depend upon Memory only: He cannot, therefore, be anſwer-

anſwerable for their PRECISE Accuracy, unleſs where the Authorities are quoted. About this Matter he was the leſs ſollicitous, becauſe his Concluſions are, for the moſt part, deducible from the GENERAL TENOR of the Circumſtances, rather than from the preciſe Amount of the Particulars.

The ſame Circumſtance that prevented him from having Acceſs to Books, kept him at a Diſtance from Men. — He thought for himſelf, and wrote what his own Judgement dictated, without having it in his Power, had he been ſo inclined, to know whether what he has ſaid will be agreeable or diſagreeable to the Favourers of one Party or of the other.

The

The Proſperity of his Country was the chief Object of his Concern, and he would be happy to ſee the Members of every Party exerting themſelves, as he has done, to the utmoſt of their Power to promote its Welfare.

Dec. 9, 1781.

THE

INTEREST

OF

GREAT BRITAIN, &c.

INTRODUCTION.

IT has appeared to me not a little extraordinary, that among the many treatiſes which have been written of late, in conſequence of the diſputes between Great Britain and her colonies, no attempt ſhould have been made to aſcertain with ſome degree of preciſion wherein conſiſt the advantages that have accrued to the mother country, or the diſadvantages that may be expected to be felt by her in conſequence of her connection with the American colonies. I have waited long in the hope of ſeeing this inveſtigation attempted by ſome perſon of abilities ſuperior to mine—but in vain. I have, therefore,

at laſt, been induced to offer my own ſentiments on that head to the public. The ſubject is intereſting; and the preſent time ſeems to be peculiarly proper for ſuch an inveſtigation. The minds of my countrymen, after having been violently agitated by the diſputes originating from the preſent conteſt, have had time to acquire a comparative degree of tranquillity, which will permit them to attend to ſuch a diſcuſſion with more temper than they could have done at any former period. The time ſeems alſo to approach when one or other of the contending parties will be obliged to liſten to terms of accommodation: and in caſe of ſuch an event it is certainly of much importance that we ſhould be able to judge with preciſion of thoſe circumſtances relating to our colonies, that will tend moſt effectually to promote the intereſts of the ſtate, and eſtabliſh peace on a firm and laſting foundation.

In entering upon this diſcuſſion, I find it neceſſary to make ſome previous remarks on the different meanings which have been annexed to the word *colonies* in antient and in modern times. The language of man is imperfect. By the progreſs of ſociety and the advancement of knowledge, every thing that relates to manners and government is perpetually changing; but as this change is gradual and imperceptible, language does

does not keep pace with it. Names remain, while the things denoted by them are found to be at different periods extremely diverſified, which is the ſource of much miſapprehenſion in ſubſequent ages both as to facts and reaſoning. This has been remarkably obſervable of late with regard to the word *colonies*. Precedents have been ſearched for in antient times, and, becauſe of a ſimilarity of name where no ſimilarity of circumſtances exiſted, inferences have been drawn that were extremely erroneous. Whether this proceeded from ignorance or deſign it boots not to enquire, but it is of importance to guard againſt ſimilar miſtakes in future. It is therefore hoped that the following ſlight hiſtorical ſketches will not be deemed ſuperfluous.

CHAP. I.

On the different meanings that have been annexed to the word COLONIES *in antient and in modern times.*

IN the earlieſt period of time, the hiſtory of which has been tranſmitted to us, the word *colony* denoted a ſtate whoſe original inhabitants had migrated in a body from ſome other known ſtate. It retained not any dependence on the parent ſtate; nor did there ſubſiſt any other bond of union between them than thoſe friendly wiſhes which naturally ſprang from the recollection of their former conſanguinity. Like a ſwarm of bees thoſe emigrants, having choſen a leader in whom they placed confidence, bid at once an eternal adieu to the place of their nativity. They looked for no aſſiſtance from home in their intended expedition, but depending on their own vigour and addreſs for obtaining a place of reſidence, they regulated their government and internal police according to the plan that appeared moſt agreeable to themſelves, and thus became, as ſoon as they were ſettled, in every reſpect a free and independent ſtate. In this manner was Cartharge a colony of Tyre, and Syracuſe a colony of Corinth; and in this manner

manner the Greek ſtates in Aſia Minor, Magna Grecia, and the iſlands of the Archipelago, though from the firſt free and independent, were univerſally allowed to be colonies which had, at different times, migrated from ſome one or other of the more antient Grecian ſtates.

When Xerxes threatened to overpower Greece, the common danger induced the greateſt part of thoſe ſtates to enter into a league for their mutual defence. On that occaſion the members of the confederacy were arranged into two claſſes, *allies* and *colonies*. Under the title of *allies* were claſſed all thoſe antient Grecian ſtates whoſe origin was involved in obſcurity. The claſs of *colonies* comprehended thoſe which were *known* to have originated from ſome other ſtate. The members, however, of both theſe claſſes were equally independent. Syracuſe, though a colony, refuſed to enter into the confederacy, becauſe ſhe was not allowed to command either by ſea or by land.

During that famous conteſt, the Spartans and Athenians early obtained a decided pre-eminence above all the other members of the confederacy. Athens, by the mildneſs of her manners, conciliated the good will of the whole, and on account of the inflexible integrity of Ariſtides, ſhe was allowed to aſcertain the proportional ſupplies

plies to be furniſhed by each of the confederates. The armies and the fleets coming at length to be alſo under the command of her generals, ſhe became in time ſo powerful as to over-awe both *colonies* and *allies*. Contributions, at firſt voluntarily granted, were continued and augmented under various pretexts, till at laſt many of the *colonies* from having been voluntary allies in defence of Athens (which was threatened with immediate deſtruction) became tributaries and ſubjects to that ambitious ſtate.

Thus by degrees the word *colony* became nearly ſynonymous with *ſubject*; and modern readers by bearing in mind the idea conveyed by the word *colony* at preſent, are naturally enough diſpoſed, from certain concurring circumſtances, to think it bore the ſame meaning at all times. To ſuch readers the decrees of Athens relating to the colonies, appear to be the natural legiſlative acts of a parent ſtate over her own colonies; which *as colonies*, originally eſtabliſhed and ſupported by herſelf, had always been ſubjected to her ſway. This, however, was far from being the caſe; thoſe colonies were merely ſubjects. States which from being totally independent and unconnected with her, had been by fraud or force brought under her dominion, and retained in ſubjection by the ſame means. Their bearing the name of colonies was, *as to her*, merely an accidental

accidental circumſtance. This appears to have been inconteſtibly the caſe in regard to the noted decree of the Athenians againſt the inhabitants of Leſbos. The Leſbians having endeavoured to free themſelves from the uſurped authority of Athens, were again overcome by their more powerful opponent. On this occaſion the enraged Athenians decreed, that all the male inhabitants of Leſbos who had attained the age of puberty, ſhould ſuffer death; and the women and children be ſold for ſlaves*. Leſbos was one of thoſe ſtates that ranked as a *colony*, but it was a colony of Æolis, not of Athens. It was not therefore becauſe of her dependance on Athens *as a colony*, that ſhe was puniſhed by this ſevere decree. It was merely becauſe of her inferiority as a ſubjected ſtate †.

Rome, originally a colony of Alba, conſidered herſelf from the beginning as a free and independent ſtate. But in proceſs of time ſhe adopted a mode of colonization, very different from thoſe we have hitherto had occaſion to obſerve.

Every

* Thucyd. Lib. 3. Cap. 49.

† I have been obliged to repreſent this tranſaction in a very different light from that in which the ingenious author of the hiſtory of the colonization of the free ſtates of antiquity has placed it, p. 55—58.

Every inſtitution of that ambitious republic ſeems to have been made with a view to conqueſt. This was, at leaſt, peculiarly the caſe in regard to thoſe ſettlements upon which ſhe beſtowed the name of colonies. When ſhe was ſuſpicious of the deſigns of any conquered ſtate, and afraid of a revolt, ſhe took from it ſome fertile diſtrict of greater or ſmaller extent, as circumſtances ſeemed to require, which ſhe peopled with a ſufficient number of Roman citizens, after having expelled the original inhabitants to make room for them. Theſe Roman citizens were put under the government of a man of authority, in whoſe approved fidelity the ſtate could ſafely confide. To theſe ſmall communities, thus eſtabliſhed, ſhe gave the name of *colonies*. Every Roman citizen, it is well known, was a ſoldier. A Roman colony therefore, might be conſidered as equivalent to a fortreſs garriſoned by Roman ſoldiers, who received in lieu of pay, a certain proportion of land belonging to the conquered ſtate.

To inſure the attachment of theſe coloniſts, they were treated with the greateſt mildneſs; and to keep up a perpetual diſtinction between them and the inhabitants of the provinces in which they were placed, a form of government was granted to them as nearly reſembling that of Rome itſelf, as their ſituation and circumſtances

ſtances would admit. Thus, each colony formed a diſtinct community by itſelf, different in laws, cuſtoms and manners from the ſubjected ſtates around them. They were, therefore, in little danger of being drawn into a revolt by the ſame cauſes that would influence the natives of the country. They became, on the contrary, perpetual ſpies upon their conduct, and were always ready to ſuppreſs, or to give warning in time, of the ſmalleſt tendency towards a revolt.

Such were the principles of Roman colonization during the virtuous days of that republic. But when corruption became general among her people, and her nobles, by that means, aſpired at dominion, the lands of her moſt virtuous citizens were ſeized, and the inhabitants driven away to make room for thoſe rapacious ſoldiers, by whoſe aſſiſtance their ambitious leader had acquired ſupreme command. Theſe laſt were called *military* colonies, to diſtinguiſh them from the former. As this claſs of colonies was compoſed of men whom the ſucceſsful leader was induced to favour, on account of the obligations he himſelf had received from them, they were indulged in many exceſſes that were incompatible with good government. And as each ſucceſsful competitor for power found himſelf obliged to make new ſettlements of the ſame ſort, the country came at laſt to be almoſt en-

tirely occupied by theſe military colonies, whoſe licentiouſneſs was one of the principal cauſes of thoſe perpetual civil diſſentions, which ended not but with the total ruin of the empire.

With the Roman empire the very name of colonies ſeems to have diſappeared for a time in Europe. Thoſe barbarous tribes which burſt forth from the northern regions, and ſeized ſucceſſively the different provinces of that mighty empire, would, all of them according to the antient and original meaning of the word, have been accounted colonies of thoſe original ſtates from which they migrated: but they never bore that name. They either retained their original name, or acquired that which their appearance*, or the ſituation of the region from whence they iſſued† firſt ſuggeſted to the conquered nations. The ſame practice prevailed during the whole of that dark period, which has obtained the appellation of *the middle ages*. But, by whatever name they were called, the kingdoms then formed were free, and altogether independent of thoſe ſtates from whence their original founders migrated. The Normans in France, and Saxons in England bore ſovereign ſway without the intervention of the parent ſtates. Even the Danes, who afterwards acquired the ſupreme power in Britain, eſtabliſhed

* Longobardi. † Normans.

liſhed in it an independent kingdom, which was in no reſpect ſubjected to the controul of Denmark, though both kingdoms were for ſome time governed by the ſame King. At an after period, when the phrenzy of the Cruſades drove ſuch multitudes from Europe to ſeize upon a barren ſpot in Aſia, it never came into the mind of any one to entitle that a European colony. It obtained the name of the *kingdom of Jeruſalem.*

Thus it happened, that during a period in which more numerous, as well as more powerful colonies were formed than perhaps had ever been known among mankind, the name was ſcarce any where to be found on the globe; whereas in the annals of Rome this name moſt frequently occurs, though during that time ſcarce any colonies were formed, either according to the antient or the modern idea annexed to that word.

But although the name of colonies ſeldom occurred during thoſe ages of ignorance and barbariſm, which ſucceeded the diſmemberment of the Roman empire, yet it was during thoſe dark ages that ideas began to be adopted which gave riſe to a new claſs of colonies, that are more extenſive, at leaſt, than any that were known by that name in antient times, and which bid fair

for producing a chain of political events equally numerous and important.

The little learning that there was in thoſe barbarous ages was entirely confined to the clergy, which gave to that claſs of men a ſuperiority above all others, that they did not fail to improve to their own advantage. The Biſhop of Rome having fallen upon means to perſuade all Europe that he was entruſted with the keys of Heaven, found little difficulty to do on earth whatever ſeemed good in his eyes. He ſoon perceived that the degree of his authority, not leſs than the extent of his power, depended upon the number of his adherents. Theſe, he knew, would be moſt effectually ſecured to his intereſt, by making them feel the temporal benefits they could reap in conſequence of their attachment to him. He therefore took care to let it be univerſally known, that all who refuſed to ſubmit to his decrees, were not only to be excluded from the kingdom of Heaven, but had no juſt claim to the enjoyment of any of the good things of this earth, and that theſe might lawfully be taken from them by his followers, wherever they were found. He even went farther, and taught that it was not only *lawful* to deſpoil ſuch perſons of their property, but that it was a ſervice acceptable in the eyes of God Almighty, to cut them off from the face of the earth. The

cruſades

crusades to the Holy land, and those undertakers against the harmless Albigenses, show how universally these ideas at one time prevailed in Europe. So universally indeed, that they came at last insensibly to influence that general system of politics, which, from its supposed universality, has obtained the name of *the law of nations*.

It was in consequence of this idea, that Ferdinand and Isabella, when they determined to send out Columbus on a voyage of discovery, solicited and obtained from the Pope a grant to them and their heirs for ever, of the sovereignty of all the countries he should discover. The original inhabitants, if there should be any, it was known were not of the Catholic faith, and, of course, they were considered as mere animals, which might either be put to death or reduced to slavery, as should best suit the views of their new sovereign or his substitutes. The same idea prevailed in regard to all the subsequent voyages of discovery that were made by the other powers of Europe: and it is under the sanction of this imaginary title, that all the colonies of the new world have been made. This has occasioned a very material difference between the modern ideas of colonization and those which prevailed among the antients.

The

The only motives which could tempt the antients to make voyages of diſcovery, were either the deſire of extending their commerce, or a deſire to obtain abroad a ſettlement for ſuch individuals as found their ſituation at home intolerably irkſome. In the firſt caſe, the merchants expected to meet with peopled countries, with the natives of which they propoſed to treat on terms of equality for their mutual conveniency. In the laſt caſe, the emigrants hoped to meet with countries either deſerted, or ſo thinly peopled, as to enable them to obtain, by force or treaty, ſuch a territory to themſelves as ſhould ſuffice for their ſubſiſtence. In either caſe the parent ſtate claimed no right of ſovereignty over the new diſcovered country. If the emigrants obtained a ſettlement, it was for themſelves alone that they obtained it. Nor could the ſtate, whoſe protection they had renounced, and which held itſelf for ever freed from any obligation to defend them, lay any claim to whatever they might afterwards acquire.

But in modern times (I ſpeak of the times in which the American diſcoveries were made) in conſequence of its having been in general underſtood that the ſovereignty of all new diſcovered countries belonged of right to that nation whoſe ſubjects firſt took formal poſſeſſion of them, every ſettlement that was made was conſidered as a

part

part of the dominions of that country, whoſe ſubjects had made that ſettlement. Hence it is, that all the preſent European inhabitants of America hold what they there poſſeſs by a grant from the ſovereign, in whoſe territories (according to the explanation of the word as above) they are ſettled; and as ſubjects lay claim to the ſupport and protection of the parent ſtate, as it is now called, againſt all enemies in every dangerous emergency. Theſe principles are ſo univerſally acknowledged, and ſo invariably confirmed by all public acts relating to the colonies, that it would be an undertaking as idle to ſet about demonſtrating them, as it would be vain to attempt diſproving them.

The court of Spain, in the hope of deriving ſome unforeſeen advantages from thoſe unknown countries which Columbus promiſed to reveal, fitted out that armament he commanded, and gave him a commiſſion to exerciſe authority in their name, in whatever country he ſhould diſcover. Similar powers were given to thoſe who ſucceeded him in the ſame employment. Thoſe who firſt went out, had no views of forming colonies; they went not in the character of emigrants, but of diſcoverers, who were entitled to ſeize what came within their reach as conquerors. The hope of the rapid gain that might be obtained by plunder, induced many to follow the

track

track of the firſt diſcoverers. They were diſappointed at firſt, and inſtead of riches found only miſery and want. Unable to return to their native country, deſpair added vigour to their undertakings. Cortes, aſſiſted by men in theſe circumſtances, ſeized a lucky moment, and got poſſeſſion of the treaſures of Mexico. The proſpect of profiting by the riches of that country, induced the Court of Spain to ſupport him in his ſucceſsful invaſion. Having ſtipulated for her own ſhare of the plunder, other adventurers were excited to make further exertions. They were ſucceſsful beyond her moſt ſanguine hopes. Riches poured in upon Spain with a profuſion that far exceeded her higheſt expectations, and gave to that court a brilliancy and ſplendor that had never before been ſeen in Europe. In theſe circumſtances, it was not *apparently* her intereſt to reſtrain her people from going to thoſe regions in which their activity ſo powerfully contributed towards the aggrandizement of the court. Diſtant conſequences were not then foreſeen; while ſhe ſeemed to be growing in greatneſs, it was not perceived that her ſtrength was gradually declining, in conſequence of the numerous outlets that were thus made for carrying off her beſt and moſt induſtrious inhabitants.

While the court of Spain enjoyed the temporary ſplendor ſhe derived from the plunder of

the new world, the neighbouring nations not only beheld her with terror, but with envy. Every European ſtate wiſhed anxiouſly to get ſome ſhare of thoſe diſtant territories, from which treaſures were obtained in ſuch abundance. Among the princes of thoſe times none ſeems to have been more powerfully influenced by theſe paſſions than James the Firſt of England, who through bad œconomy, was ever in want, and who, fond of arbitrary power, could ill put up with the parſimonious reſtraints his ſubjects ſo often put upon him. He, therefore, lent a willing ear to every propoſal that opened the ſmalleſt proſpect of giving him any part of thoſe golden regions which he doubted not would ſoon enable him to reign with glory, independent of that officious parliament which ſo often thwarted his wiſhes. Nor were individuals wanting to ſecond theſe views of the needy monarch. Sir Walter Raleigh, at once the boaſt and the opprobrium of the age in which he lived, by ſpecious falſehoods took advantage of the popularity he enjoyed to poiſon the minds of the people, and to buoy up the prince in his favourite hopes. Raleigh failed, but ſtill the idea prevailed that what he attempted in vain might yet be obtained by purſuing another plan. A company of merchants, with an ill adviſed temerity, undertook the taſk. The King, as might be expected, gave them all the encouragement in his power;

in imitation of the King of Spain reſerving to himſelf a ſhare of thoſe treaſures they all expected to obtain, he granted them whatever other privileges they deſired. The adventurers effected a landing in America; but inſtead of thoſe mountains of gold they looked for, they only found poverty and wretchedneſs; and ſoon fell a ſacrifice to their own rapacity, improvidence, and brutality.

Various were the plans, and many were the attempts to effect this favourite project, before a permanent footing could be obtained upon the American continent: but nothing could extinguiſh the ſanguine hopes of the Prince, or the eager cupidity of his ſubjects. A feeble ſettlement was at length effected, at an immenſe expence to the company, and with a deplorable waſte of the human ſpecies, from which no adequate returns to the partners could ever be drawn. They were at laſt obliged to relinquiſh their hopes, and give up their property in an adventure which had been fraught with endleſs trouble and accumulated expences.

It is the nature of the human mind, that when it has once been accuſtomed to proceed in a certain track, it cannot eaſily be diverted from it. For more than a century the nation had been accuſtomed to look upon America as a paradiſe.

radiſe. Individuals indeed had experienced that this was a miſtake, but the national prejudice ſtill leaned to that ſide. New adventurers were found who wiſhed to explore thoſe regions.—Among theſe a ſect of fanatics ſeem to have been the firſt who formed the idea of eſtabliſhing a colony, with an intention of remaining for ever in that country. Perſecuted at home by bigots, a number of perſons ſtill more bigoted, if poſſible, to their own chimerical tenets, than thoſe they left behind them, under the ſanction of that government which never could relinquiſh the idea of the treaſures that would there be found, took poſſeſſion of a part of that country which had ſo long excited the cupidity of Europe. The troubles that enſued in Britain, tended ſtill more to people thoſe newly ſettled regions with ſectariſts of different perſuaſions: nor was it till after the civil wars that either the King or the people had time to attend particularly to thoſe diſtant ſettlements; the proſperity of which all parties wiſhed to promote, from a certain preconceived opinion that they would prove in ſome way or other extremely beneficial to the parent ſtate; although they could not at that time form a diſtinct idea of the manner in which thoſe beneficial effects were to be produced.

Thus, from accident rather than from preconcerted deſign, was formed a ſpecies of colonies,

altogether different from any that had ever been known in Europe. Emigrants, inſtead of going out in a powerful body with a reſolution to ſeek a ſettlement for themſelves, and to retain no farther connection with the mother country, went out in ſmall parties from that part of the King's dominions in which they had been born, to occupy what was deemed another part of the ſame King's dominions, under ſuch conditions as government thought proper to grant them. Theſe new ſettlements, although they in ſome reſpects reſembled a Roman colony, were in other reſpects extremely different from it. A Roman province reſembled in every reſpect a conquered ſtate in modern times; its original inhabitants were ſtill allowed to poſſeſs their native country, under ſuch reſtrictions as the conquering ſtate thought proper to impoſe. It was to ſecure the advantages ariſing from the inhabitants of thoſe provinces, and to compel them to pay ſuch tribute and ſervices as were exacted from them, that the colonies were eſtabliſhed. They therefore, as has been ſaid, ſerved the ſame purpoſe as a fortreſs in a conquered province at preſent. But an American colony reſembles a Roman province only in point of ſituation; no advantage is propoſed to be drawn from the natives of the country; the whole province is to be peopled by the original inhabitants of the ſtate itſelf, which finds, or thinks it finds that it contributes

tributes more to its own proſperity, that a part of its inhabitants ſhould be placed in that particular province, than that they ſhould remain in any other part of its original poſſeſſions.

It was neceſſary to trace the origin of theſe colonies thus minutely, not only becauſe it tends to place in a conſpicuous point of view the difference between antient colonies and thoſe which form the ſubject of our preſent diſcuſſion, but alſo to trace the gradual ſteps by which mankind were led to adopt a mode of colonization, ſo different in many reſpects from all others that have made their appearance on the globe. From the foregoing detail it is ſufficiently obvious, that none of the parties who originally contributed to the forming theſe eſtabliſhments, had an adequate idea of the diſtant effects that theſe changes were to produce on the affairs of Europe. Leaving that to be aſcertained by others, all parties have been content with acting merely from the impulſe of the preſent moment: nor does it appear, that their ſucceſſors have ever yet taken the trouble to inveſtigate the ſubject with the attention its great importance ſeems to demand. This I ſhall attempt to do in the following pages, after having taken a curſory view of ſome other European ſettlements which have alſo been called colonies; though differing from thoſe on the American continent in ſeveral reſpects.

ſpects. The reader will thus be enabled to have under his eye at once all the different meanings, antient as well as modern, that have been annexed to the word *colonies*, and be enabled to diſtinguiſh in what caſes any of the arguments that ſhall be employed may or may not apply to the other ſettlements that are known by the ſame name.

When the Portugueſe began their voyages of diſcovery, they ſent out feeble ſquadrons, with no other view than to explore the unknown coaſts of Africa, and to eſtabliſh a friendly commercial intercourſe with the natives. Succeſs induced them to extend their enterprizes, and they found it neceſſary to eſtabliſh a few poſts along the coaſt, where their factors could remain in ſafety during the abſence of their ſhips. After they had doubled the Cape of Good Hope, and got acceſs to the Indian ſeas, they found numerous nations, abounding in people, and conſiderably advanced in arts and civilization. With theſe they wiſhed to eſtabliſh a friendly correſpondence; but being thwarted in their attempts, they, partly by intrigue, and partly by force, obtained poſſeſſion of ſome ſea-port towns, which they fortified for their own ſecurity. And although they afterwards took an active concern in the diſputes between the Indian princes, as it ſeemed to promote their intereſt, yet their views were chiefly

chiefly confined to mercantile advantages; and they never graſped at territorial dominion farther than ſeemed neceſſary to ſecure their commerce. The Dutch, and the Engliſh, who gradually expelled the Portugueſe and the Spaniards from thoſe regions, purſued the ſame general plan of conduct. They endeavoured to bring the Indian princes under ſubjection, that they might obtain an excluſive right to their whole commerce: but there is no inſtance of their having attempted to make ſettlements with a view to cultivate the ground by their own people. The poſſeſſions, therefore, of the Duch and of the Engliſh in the Eaſt Indies, are extremely unlike to thoſe on the American continent; and if at any time they have acquired the name of *colonies*, they muſt be conſidered in a very different light from thoſe already mentioned, and upon a proper inveſtigation it would be found, that they are productive of political conſequences to the ſtates to which they belong, very different from thoſe which have enſued from the eſtabliſhment of the American colonies. But this is not within the limits of our preſent inveſtigation.

The European ſettlements in the Weſt India iſlands affords an example of another ſpecies of colonies, in ſeveral reſpects differing from either of thoſe already mentioned. Theſe iſlands fitted

by

by nature for producing ſeveral valuable articles which European climates cannot bring to perfection, have become the property of wealthy men, who reſide chiefly in Europe. Theſe proprietors cultivate their fields, neither by the natives of the country, as in the Faſt-Indies, nor by European emigrants, as in North America, but by negro ſlaves, purchaſed with their money inſtead of cattle. The whole produce of theſe iſlands, therefore, after deducting the expence of management, belongs to the inhabitants of the ſtate to which the ſettlement appertains. The political conſequences which reſult from this arrangement alſo I do not attempt here to aſcertain.

I now proceed to the inveſtigation of the ſubject propoſed.

CHAP. II.

General Obſervations on the Conſequences that reſult from extended Dominion.

IT is univerſally admitted, that the real ſtrength of a kingdom conſiſts in the *number* of its inhabitants, and that its riches will be in proportion to the induſtry of its people.

But

But this propoſition admits of limitation: for, it is alſo admitted, that of two countries which contain an equal number of inhabitants, that whoſe territory is leaſt extenſive, will be the moſt powerful. This ariſes not only from the greater difficulty of defending a large territory than one of ſmaller extent, but alſo from ſeveral other cauſes, which, though equally important, are not at firſt ſight ſo obvious.

Induſtry can never be carried to any conſiderable height, but in civilized countries. In a ſtate of nature, every one is ſo much engaged in providing for his perſonal ſafety, that he has no leiſure to attend to other objects; and his tenure of the things he poſſeſſes is at beſt ſo precarious, that he can have no ſort of *ſtimulus* to induce him to become induſtrious. He ſubſiſts on the caſual pittance that nature throws in his way; for as he has no power to ſecure to himſelf accumulated ſtores, he never thinks of extending his views far beyond the wants of the preſent moment.

But as man could not ſubſiſt in many parts of this globe without ſome precaution and forecaſt, he has been impelled by neceſſity to unite with others into ſociety, for their mutual protection and well being. In every civil ſociety a certain proportion of men muſt be inveſted with

power, not only to puniſh ſuch individuals as attempt to diſturb the internal peace of the community, but alſo to guard againſt the attacks of others from without; to repel force by force, if need be, ſo as to ſecure the general tranquillity, and allow individuals to proſecute at leiſure their particular employments, and to enjoy undiſturbed the fruits of their own induſtry.

Theſe bleſſings, however, cannot be obtained without ſubjecting individuals to ſome inconveniencies. Thoſe who are entruſted with the care of preſerving the public tranquillity, in other words, the ruling powers, muſt be liberally paid for their labour and care. The different perſons who are required for enforcing the laws, and adminiſtering juſtice *within* the realm, as well as thoſe who are neceſſary to defend it from *external* injuries, muſt all be paid by thoſe who reap the benefits of protection and ſecurity. This conſtitutes a tax upon the ſubject, which will be more or leſs oppreſſive in proportion to its amount, the manner in which it is raiſed, and the ability of the people to pay it.

In a country of great extent, where the inhabitants are few, the *quantum* of this tax, in proportion to the number of inhabitants, muſt of neceſſity be much greater than in another country, where the ſame number of people are contained

tained in ſmaller room; where the people are numerous, a ſmall inimical force could not produce any ſenſible inconvenience. Many men could in that caſe be ſuddenly collected, who would be able to repel ſuch hoſtile attacks; a few forts could ſecure their frontiers, or a ſmall number of troops could be ſo ſtationed, as to be ready to oppoſe any invaders. But many more garriſons, or troops much more numerous, will be required to ſecure the inhabitants of a wide extended country from danger and from inſult.

The ſame reaſoning applies in reſpect to the internal police of the country. The difficulty of obtaining prompt juſtice againſt every tranſgreſſor muſt, for obvious reaſons, be much greater in thoſe countries where the people are thinly ſcattered, than where they are more numerous, and therefore, the expence, if equal ſecurity is obtained, muſt be in proportion great upon the poor country; ſo I ſhall for brevity, ſtile, in future, that country which is moſt thinly peopled.

In conſequence of theſe difficulties, others ariſe which tend ſtill more and more to aggravate the diſtreſſes of the *poor* country.

The money which is required for ſupporting the civil and the military eſtabliſhment, muſt be raiſed by ſome mode or other from the people;

and whatever mode ſhall be adopted, it will be found that the expence muſt be much higher in the poor than in the richer country. If this tax ſhall be either by exciſe or cuſtoms, ſo many perſons become neceſſary to collect it in the poor country, that a great part of the money ſo collected, can never find its way into the treaſury. Sometimes the whole that is collected, does not ſerve to pay the ſalary of the tax gatherers; whereas in a rich country, the proportion of the tax that is neceſſary to pay the collectors is very ſmall*. Much more money, therefore, muſt be paid

* The expence of collecting the exciſe in *England*, is about ſix per cent. of the groſs produce. The expence of collecting the exciſe in Scotland is about 31 per cent. of the groſs produce. This difference is owing to Scotland's being upon the whole leſs populous than England. But if we conſider, that in England the counties of Derby, Northumberland, Cumberland, Cornwall, and the whole principality of Wales, are nearly as thinly inhabited as moſt parts of Scotland, and therefore muſt tend to increaſe the proportional expence of collecting *upon the whole*, and if we at the ſame time conſider, that in Edinburgh, Glaſgow, Aberdeen, Dundee, and many other places in Scotland, the expence of collecting the exciſe muſt be as low as in any part of England; which muſt tend to diminiſh the proportional expence of collection *upon the whole* in that country; it is probable, that the rate of collection in the moſt populous parts of Britain, might be fixed at one and a half, or two per cent. and in the leaſt populous at 80, 90, or 100 per cent. I myſelf know ſeveral country diſtricts which I have been aſſured, from the moſt undoubted authority, never produced enough to pay the officers ſalary.

paid by the inhabitants of a poor than of a rich country, before an equal ſum can be brought into the exchequer. But we have already ſeen, that a great deal more muſt be paid into the exchequer by the inhabitants of a poor country than a rich one, before they can obtain equal ſecurity; they muſt therefore be doubly oppreſſed. Thus it appears, that a thinly peopled country muſt not only be weaker, but the inhabitants muſt alſo be much more ſeverely taxed than thoſe of a ſmaller country, inhabited by an equal number of people: nor do their difficulties end here; other inconveniencies ſtill attend them.

In a well peopled country, the labourer and manufacturer are neceſſarily ſo near to each other, that they can, with the utmoſt facility, make a mutual interchange of the products of their induſtry; the labourer giving of the product of his fields for the manufactures he ſtands in need of. In this caſe there is the leaſt poſſible waſte of labour, and therefore in this ſituation, both the produce of the fields and manufactures can be afforded at the loweſt rate poſſible. If the goods in theſe circumſtances be conſigned to retailers, the caſe will not be altered, as the labourers and manufacturers will thus ſave more in time than will be ſufficient to pay for the retailer's profit.

But

But if the country be thinly peopled, all kinds of grain and manufactures muſt be carried from a conſiderable diſtance to market. Both buyers and ſellers are ſubjected to many inconveniencies, and much loſs of labour and time, becauſe of the diſtance they muſt go for the various articles they need; and even at beſt can meet with but a poor aſſortment, and ſales being ſlow and precarious, the retailer's profit muſt be proportionally high. This ſituation gives birth to a third employment, that of carriers, which, tho' neceſſary in theſe circumſtances, is totally unproductive, becauſe the whole gains they make muſt be added to the price of the ſeveral articles they tranſport, without adding to their value.

The poor country is ſtill liable to new inconveniencies. Carriers muſt have roads; if theſe are bad, the charge of carriage is much augmented. But it requires much greater exertions to make good roads in a thinly peopled country, than in one where the inhabitants are numerous.

I might continue this parallel much farther, and ſhew that in every particular the advantage is greatly in favour of the peopled country; but that might be tireſome. Let it ſuffice here to obſerve in general, that in every ſtate there are only two claſſes of people whoſe buſineſs is really productive, viz. the labourer and manufacturer,

of artiſan: that all other claſſes of people, under whatever denomination they appear, are unproductive, and therefore burthenſome to the ſtate*. The leſs numerous, therefore, this laſt claſs of citizens is in any ſtate, the more vigorous will it be in proportion to the number of people it contains. But in a thinly peopled country, almoſt every denomination of this claſs of citizens muſt be neceſſarily more numerous than where people abound. In theſe circumſtances, a greater number of places are neceſſary for regulating the affairs of government and police. More numerous judges, lawyers, with their dependents of inferior note, are required; more powerful armies and navies muſt be maintained. The officers for collecting the revenue muſt be multiplied almoſt in a geometrical proportion; and the claſs of carriers, &c. will be augmented nearly in the ſame degree. All which tends not leſs to diminiſh the number of the uſeful and productive claſs of citizens, than to clog their induſtry and abate their vigour.

Theſe are a few of the numerous cauſes which have induced political writers to admit, that of two

* Were it neceſſary, it might be ſhewn, that ſome of thoſe who are ranked among the unproductive inhabitants are uſeful in certain reſpects, others neceſſary, and a few deſtructive; but the diſcuſſion would be long, and on the preſent occaſion is unneceſſary, becauſe it would not alter the general concluſion.

two countries, containing the ſame number of inhabitants, that ſhall be the weakeſt which occupies the greateſt extent of territory. The exact proportion of this inferiority cannot be aſcertained with mathematical preciſion, becauſe it muſt vary with circumſtances; but the uſual computation which ſuppoſes, that if the one country be double the ſize of the other, its ſtrength will be as *one*, while that of the other is as *four*, ſeems to be near the truth. We muſt regret, that a truth ſo neceſſary to be known, ſhould be ſo little obvious to thoſe who take but a ſuperficial view of things; as the want of this degree of knowledge has occaſioned more numerous miſtakes in government, and has been productive of greater miſery among mankind, than perhaps any other that could be named.

It is chiefly owing to this circumſtance, that the hiſtory of paſt ages is little elſe than a narrative of enterprizes undertaken by weak or wicked princes, with a view to enlarge the extent of their dominion, in the hope of thus encreaſing the power of themſelves and their ſucceſſors, and of miſery to the people, and revolutions that enſued to the ruin of the prince, inſtead of that ſteady power they hoped to enjoy. The only ſtates in which the felicity of the people has been conſiderable, and of long duration, have been thoſe whoſe want of power precluded any idea

idea of conqueſt. Yet, the mind of man ſo naturally aſpires at domination, that there is hardly an inſtance in the annals of paſt ages of any ſtate having voluntarily declined to extend the limits of its empire when an opportunity offered, whatever were the circumſtances of the country they were to annex to their own.

If the preceding reaſoning be well founded, we have room to doubt if our forefathers acted with prudence, when they ſhewed ſo much ſolicitude to extend the bounds of the Britiſh empire in America. We thus acquired, it is true, an immenſe tract of country, abundantly fertile, and capable of maintaining an innumerable multitude of people, but that country totally deſtitute of inhabitants. As individuals in Britain have been accuſtomed to value their poſſeſſions, by the extent and fertility of the ſoil which belonged to them, we naturally enough applied the ſame rule to judge of the value of thoſe countries that have been annexed to the Britiſh empire, not properly adverting to the difference of circumſtances between ourſelves and the weſtern continent. Had Ruſſia, which is a thinly peopled, and in many places a fertile country, acquired theſe poſſeſſions, individuals there would have judged of their value after a different manner. They know that at home it is neither the extent of their poſſeſſions, nor the richneſs of the

ſoil, that conſtitutes the value of an eſtate, but the number of people it contains. In transferring an eſtate, therefore, they mention not the number of its acres, but the number of its people, and according to that number they eſtimate its value. In Ruſſia, therefore, thoſe immenſe territories we have acquired without any inhabitants, upon the poſſeſſion of which we plume ourſelves ſo much, would not have been accounted of any value at all. Whether does the Ruſſian or Briton in this caſe judge moſt wiſely? Many particulars muſt be attended to before this queſtion can be properly decided. It is only neceſſary here to remark, that they both judge from habit rather than from reaſoning, and that they are of courſe equally liable to be miſtaken. It is not thus that mankind ſhould judge in matters of ſo much importance.

From what has already been ſaid, it will appear evident, that although America had been contiguous to Britain, ſo as to have admitted of being united with it into one connected kingdom, although it would in that caſe have been more eaſily defended and governed than at preſent, yet on account of the diſperſion of our people that would neceſſarily take place, upon the acquiſition of ſuch an extended territory, the empire muſt have been weakened, and its induſtry diminiſhed. It follows, that as America

rica is ſituated, disjoined from Britain by ſuch a tract of ocean, and therefore ſo much more difficult to be protected or governed, theſe inconveniences muſt be felt in a ſtill ſtronger degree, unleſs their bad effects are counterbalanced by ſome favourable circumſtances, that have not yet been taken into the account.

Again: had the intereſt of America been ſo much the ſame with that of Britain, as not to admit of their being in any caſe disjoined or oppoſed to each other, even then, for the reaſons already adduced, the whole empire, conſiſting of the American colonies and Britain conſidered as one aggregate body, would have been conſiderably weakened, and its induſtry abated. But if the intereſts of America may, in many caſes, be ſeparated from thoſe of Britain; if they may be in ſome caſes directly oppoſed to each other, it muſt follow, that Britain, conſidered merely in itſelf, muſt have been weakened in an infinitely greater proportion, in conſequence of the ſettlement of theſe colonies.

That the intereſt of America is in moſt caſes different from that of Britain, and that in many caſes they directly oppoſe each other, will not be denied by any thinking man, who either knows the countries, or attends to the tranſactions that occur almoſt every day. We muſt not therefore

conſider the people of Britain and thoſe of America as one compacted whole, continually tending towards one object, but as an aggregate, conſiſting of diſcordant elements, which, acting in different ways, can in no caſe produce an effect at all proportioned to the power of the whole; and which acting on ſome occaſions in *contrary* directions, mutually tend to weaken and deſtroy each other.

I wiſh the reader to attend to this circumſtance as a matter of importance, which has been hitherto either overlooked or miſunderſtood. However much it may tend to promote the general ſecurity and proſperity, that both the parent ſtate and the colonies ſhould be rich and flouriſhing, yet it is contrary to nature to expect that each party will not wiſh to promote its own intereſt, rather than that of another, where they interfere. It cannot but promote the intereſt of the coloniſts, for them to bear as ſmall a ſhare as poſſible of the public expence, and therefore it muſt be their unanimous wiſh, to oppoſe by every means in their power the impoſition of taxes and duties of every kind upon them. It muſt, on the other hand, be the intereſt of Britain to free herſelf as much as poſſible from the expence of government; ſhe muſt therefore wiſh to lay as great a proportion of that expence upon the colonies as ſhe thinks their circumſtances will permit.

permit. I ſay theſe things *muſt* happen ſo long as man continues to be influenced by thoſe paſſions, by which he has been actuated in all ages and countries, and therefore it does not imply the ſmalleſt reflection on either party. Let them change ſituations as often as you pleaſe, the caſe would not be altered. The perſons on both ſides would act in the ſame manner as they do at preſent.

I purpoſely here omit making uſe of the word *right*, becauſe it tends only to embarraſs the argument. In matters of government, *neceſſity* is the only meaſure of right or wrong. If one man feels that his intereſt is hurt by another, he will ſubmit to that as a hardſhip, ſo long as he finds he cannot avoid it without ſubjecting himſelf to a greater inconvenience, but no longer: and this is ſtill more obviouſly the caſe with regard to nations. It is *intereſt* alone which eſtabliſhes the *rights* of government, and *power* that maintains them. It follows, that in all caſes the weak muſt make their intereſts yield to the ſtrong, which will eſtabliſh what are called *rights* of a kind that never would have been acknowledged but from neceſſity, and which will be immediately reclaimed as ſoon as the weak ſhall have power to protect themſelves. It is vain, therefore, for any government ever to rely upon its *rights* as a means of perpetuating its dominion

over

over a ſubjected ſtate, or of regulating its conduct. It is intereſt or power alone which can inſure dominion.

Upon theſe principles, then, it will appear ſufficiently obvious, that as it never can be the intereſt of a diſtant colony to contribute to the public expence, if it can poſſibly be avoided; ſo if they ever at any time ſubmit to do it, this will be only through neceſſity, and with extreme reluctance. And however *juſt* that may be, if conſidered on the principles of *equity*, yet, as ſuch burthens are impoſed by a power which muſt itſelf be benefited by them, it will appear in the eyes of the weaker party an unjuſt impoſition, which therefore will be accounted grievous, and will excite in their boſoms a ſpirit of diſcontent, that can never be allayed. The affections of the inhabitants will thus be gradually alienated from the parent ſtate, and it will be impoſſible ever to bring them heartily to cooperate with her in any meaſure that does not tend *directly* to promote *their own* immediate intereſt.

Theſe conſequences might have been foreſeen before the American colonies began to be planted; but nations are not apt to attend with care to diſtant conſequences. They might have been clearly obſerved long before the preſent period,

and

and ſteps might have been taken to obviate them; but national prejudices are not eaſily removed. It is not now, one would imagine, poſſible that the judicious part of the nation ſhould not perceive them, and concur in adopting effectual meaſures for obviating the inconveniences complained of; but it is eaſier to perceive a grievance than to remove it. It is eaſier to point it out, than to *convince* a multitude that it exiſts.

However that may be, I think myſelf authoriſed to conclude, that in examining the power or the riches of the Britiſh empire, we are not at liberty to include the people of America in our computation. We muſt conſider Britain by herſelf, as the fundamental ſtate, and regard America as an extraneous appendage, not neceſſarily connected with her. We muſt view it as an accidental acquiſition which may be loſt. Our aim, therefore, ſhould be to preſerve the vigour of the parent ſtate independent of its colonies. To avail ourſelves to the utmoſt of the benefits that may be derived from them, but not for a moment to forget, that they can never be connected with Britain into one compacted uniform empire; that ſooner or later they muſt be ſeparated from her, and that ſhe muſt ſo act as to be prepared for that event.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

The Spaniſh and Britiſh Colonies in America compared.

IN political ſpeculations, ſo many circumſtances require to be attended to, that it is in general much ſafer to truſt to experience, than to reaſoning: at leaſt reaſoning alone never commands ſuch entire conviction, as when it is illuſtrated by oppoſite examples. I ſhall therefore have recourſe to this mode of illuſtration, whereever an opportunity offers.

The Spaniſh and the Britiſh ſettlements in America reſemble each other in ſo many reſpects, that it is impoſſible to treat of the one without thinking of the other; yet it is not a little ſingular to obſerve, that authors have not been more unanimous in attributing the ruin of Spain to her American colonies, than they have been in aſcribing the proſperity of Britain to her's. From what cauſes, it may be aſked, do two inſtitutions, ſo nearly alike, produce ſuch oppoſite effects?

Upon inveſtigating this ſubject, I find no other reaſon aſſigned for the ruinous conſequences that have

have reſulted from the Spaniſh ſettlements; but that the chief purſuit of the inhabitants is the digging for the precious metals, whereas the Britiſh coloniſts have been chiefly occupied in cultivating the ſoil. This *auri ſacra fames*, as it has been emphatically called, of the Spaniards, has afforded a copious field for declamation, which readily catches the attention of a careleſs reader; but a philoſophical enquirer, when he cooly ſets himſelf to diſcover how it ſhould come to paſs that one ſet of coloniſts, merely becauſe they followed the buſineſs of mining, ſhould prove ſo deſtructive to the parent ſtate, while another ſet of coloniſts, nearly in ſimilar circumſtances in other reſpects, merely becauſe they had betaken themſelves chiefly to agriculture, ſhould have ſo much benefited the parent ſtate, will find himſelf much at a loſs to account for theſe two oppoſite effects. He would naturally fall into a chain of reaſoning of the following kind.

The proſperity of a ſtate, he would ſay, depends on the induſtry of its inhabitants. If its people are fully employed at all times, and if they are enabled to earn wherewithal to procure the neceſſaries of life in abundance, it ſeems a matter of very great indifference what is the principal manufacture of the colony, provided that does not interfere with the manufactures of

the parent ſtate. Agriculture, indeed, in as far as it tends to furniſh the coloniſts with *food*, ſeems to claim the firſt attention of every ſociety; but thoſe neceſſaries being once obtained, it does not naturally claim a preference in a commercial view above any other employment. Local circumſtances muſt, in this caſe, determine the preference. But it does not appear that the Spaniſh Americans ever ſuffer from the want of proviſions, and therefore they are left at liberty to follow that kind of manufacture which beſt ſuits their ſituation and circumſtances. Particular conſiderations have determined them to proſecute the buſineſs of mining in preference to that of agriculture; and where, I would aſk, conſiſts the deſtructive tendency of this choice? Conſidered in itſelf, it does not appear that this employment is accounted peculiarly pernicious to ſociety. A great part of the inhabitants of Cornwall are continually employed in digging for tin, and ſmelting its ores; and thoſe of Northumberland in digging coal-mines; yet who has ever imagined that either of theſe manufactures have proved hurtful to Britain? Have they not, on the contrary, been always eſteemed highly beneficial, by furniſhing conſtant employment for numbers of induſtrious ſubjects? In what reſpect does the digging for gold or ſilver, differ from the digging for other metals? I have never heard that

they

they were reckoned in any reſpect more pernicious. Long before the diſcovery of America, Spain itſelf poſſeſſed numerous mines of theſe precious metals, which were worked to a great extent, yet we never heard that the country was either weakened or impoveriſhed by this employment. Why then, it may be aſked, ſhould this buſineſs prove ſo peculiarly pernicious in America? A ſatisfactory anſwer does not occur.

Should it be ſaid that a lucky adventurer may gain extraordinary profits, which by ſuddenly enriching him will deprive the ſtate of an induſtrious ſubject, and tend to introduce luxury and diſſipation;—ſome would anſwer, that the ſooner this ſhould happen in a colony, ſo ſituated as theſe are, the better it would be for the parent ſtate; becauſe from thence muſt be obtained all the articles of elegance and luxurious ſplendour. But waving this argument, it might be juſtly obſerved, that the ſame thing may happen in regard to every other manufacture, and may ſtill oftener be expected to occur in trade. Shall therefore commerce and manufactures be diſcouraged, becauſe in the practice of them men by a lucky hit may ſometimes amaſs amazing fortunes? The oftener ſuch incidents occur, the ſooner no doubt will luxury and diſſipation prevail; but theſe are only leſſer

evils, which muſt be expected to flow from the beſt of human inſtitutions. Perſevering induſtry itſelf will neceſſarily produce the ſame effects.

If we next turn our attention to the commerce and manufactures of the parent ſtate, it does not appear in what reſpect the Spaniſh ſettlements ſhould differ materially from thoſe of Britain. Gold and ſilver are as much articles of commerce, as rice or tobacco; and the digging for them interferes as little with the manufactures of Spain, as the culture of any article reared in the Britiſh colonies does with the produce or manufactures of Britain, and infinitely leſs ſo than many of them; and as the Spaniſh coloniſts are ſupplied with as great a proportion of their cloaths, tools, furniture, and articles of luxury from the parent ſtate, as any of the Britiſh coloniſts are, it does not appear that any ſatisfactory reaſon can be aſſigned why the Spaniſh colonies ſhould not be *equally* beneficial to the parent ſtate as thoſe of Great-Britain.

It cannot however be denied, that ſince the diſcovery of America, the manufactures of Spain have greatly declined: whereas thoſe of Great-Britain have rather increaſed ſince that period: and as no other way of accounting for this

this phenomenon appeared ſo eaſy as to aſcribe the ruin of the Spaniſh manufactures to the abundance of the precious metals that flowed in upon Spain from America, no other reaſon has been ſought for. But this opinion, if duly examined, will be found to be equally groundleſs with the former.

"When a country, it might be ſaid, poſſeſſes much money in proportion to the neighbouring nations, the value of that money will naturally fall in proportion to the ſuperabundance. Manufactures in theſe circumſtances muſt neceſſarily become of a higher nominal value than before, and therefore could not be ſold at the ſame price with the manufactures of other countries in which the money continued of as high a value as formerly. The demand therefore for the manufactures of the country abounding with money muſt ſoon ceaſe, and with the demand the manufactures muſt fall to the ground. But in conſequence of the great influx of the precious metals into Spain after the diſcovery of America, the value of theſe metals decreaſed, it is ſaid, in a much higher proportion than in the neighbouring nations, which neceſſarily ruined the manufactures of that country. It is thus, ſay they, that the Spaniſh American colonies have ruined the mother country, while thoſe of Britain, from which none of theſe metals have been

been obtained, have tended to encourage her manufactures as well as to extend her commerce.

It muſt be allowed that this reaſoning would be concluſive, were the facts as they are there ſtated; but unluckily that is not the caſe. The treaſures of America were never allowed to remain ſo long in Spain, as to ſink the value of her ſpecie below the ſtandard of other commercial ſtates in Europe. It is indeed doubtful if ever it there fell ſo low as it has long been both in Britain and Holland. The price of labour and proviſions has in general been much lower in Spain, than in either of thoſe countries; yet it is well known that the manufactures of Britain and Holland continue ſtill to flouriſh. The ruin of the Spaniſh manufactures therefore cannot be attributed to the trade they carry on to America for gold and ſilver:—it muſt ariſe from ſome other cauſe. Britain and Holland carry on an extenſive trade to Cadiz for theſe metals, which trade inſtead of ruining their manufactures has tended to augment them.

From the whole of this inveſtigation, we ſhall be obliged to conclude, that if Spain has been hurt in conſequence of her connection with America, it cannot with any appearance of juſtice be aſcribed to the mining for gold or ſilver, which

which conſtitutes the chief employment of her people. On the contrary, as this employment furniſhes a trade equally lucrative and beneficial to the parent ſtate, with any other they could have followed, we muſt ſearch for ſome other cauſe of thoſe inconveniencies that have been ſo long and ſo loudly complained of.

That ſome radical defect has prevailed in the political œconomy of Spain ever ſince the diſcovery of America, will not be denied by any one who compares her condition at that period with what it is at preſent. Spain, according to her beſt hiſtorians, contained at the time that Columbus ſet ſail for America, about twenty five millions of inhabitants, and poſſeſſed numerous manufactures which were in the moſt flouriſhing ſtate. Her population *now* ſcarce amounts to eight millions, and her manufactures deſerve not to be named. At that time ſhe was the moſt warlike and powerful ſtate in Europe; and the immediate ſucceſſors of Ferdinand and Iſabella, made large ſtrides to the attainment of univerſal dominion, which neither they nor the princes around them conſidered as ſuch a chimerical project as we now know it to have been. Little did they foreſee that their deſcendants would ſo ſoon be obliged to rely upon the charitable aid of the neighbouring nations to prevent them from becoming the ſubjects of France.

Their

Their debility and indolence have almoſt become proverbial. To what cauſe are we to aſcribe ſuch an humiliating change?

The depopulation of Spain has been by many aſcribed entirely to the baniſhment of the Moors and Jews out of that country, and the long wars waged by Ferdinand, Charles, and his ſon Philip. The wars of theſe cruel princes were indeed ſhocking and deſtructive; and the baniſhing of ſo many induſtrious ſubjects was impolitic in the extreme. It drained the country of ſeveral millions of her beſt inhabitants. But any one who conſiders that it is now about two hundred years ſince thoſe wars ceaſed, and reflects upon what ſhould have been the natural encreaſe of twenty millions of people, (and I never heard it computed that the whole loſs of people by war and baniſhment together amounted to five millions) in that period, will eaſily perceive that the whole loſs ſuſtained by theſe cauſes, would long before this time have been fully replaced by the natural increaſe of the remaining inhabitants, had not ſome powerful circumſtance prevented it. So far is this loſs however, from being replaced, that the depopulation has continued to proceed to an unexampled degree. And as no other cauſe for this depopulation can be aſſigned, except the peopling of America, we ſhall be conſtrained to admit

mit that it is her colonies, and not the expulſion of the Moors from Spain, that have at the ſame time diminiſhed her inhabitants and ruined the manufactures of the kingdom. It behoves us now to enquire into the cauſe of this alarming phenomenon, which will be beſt diſcovered by a ſhort detail of hiſtorical facts.

Soon after the diſcovery of America, the court of Spain in conſequence of the protection ſhe afforded to the mercileſs ravagers of that extenſive continent, became poſſeſſed of ſuch extenſive revenues, independent of the aid of her European ſubjects, as enabled her at a very early period to trample upon the boaſted liberties of Spain, and to erect upon their ruins that ſyſtem of deſpotiſm both civil and religious, which ever ſince hath ſo remarkably prevailed in that country. This revolution alone would be ſufficient to account in a great meaſure for that decline in the ſpirit of national induſtry which began to be obſerved about that time.

Theſe unlooked-for treaſures likewiſe cheriſhed in the minds of the Spaniſh princes thoſe ſeeds of ambition which had begun to appear ever ſince the junction of the crowns of Caſtile and Arragon; and engendered thoſe long and bloody wars which for a century ravaged all Europe. During the continuance of thoſe wars,

little attention was beſtowed upon the kingdom of Spain itſelf. America being then accounted an inexhauſtible fund of treaſure that would abundantly make up for all deficiencies, was more regarded: and as it was imagined that the returns from thence would be abundant in proportion to the numbers who went thither, no care was taken to prevent the emigration of that numberleſs multitude who preſſed to go to thoſe regions where gold was to be obtained with ſo much eaſe.*

In conſequence of theſe cauſes, added to thoſe already enumerated, the inhabitants of Spain were much diminiſhed in number, and by conſequence

* Some readers will think there is here a contradiction of what went before. THERE it was ſaid that the gold and ſilver mines of America have not proved the ruin of Spain: HERE it ſeems as if the bad conſequences that Spain experienced are attributed to the precious metals. A little attention will remove the ambiguity.

It has never been denied that the inordinate deſire of obtaining riches operated the deſtruction of Spain. But although gold and ſilver conſtitute one ſpecies of riches, they are not the only ſubſtances which merit that appellation. Corn and wine may deſerve the name of riches as juſtly as ſilver or gold: thoſe, therefore, who conclude that becauſe Spain was ruined by an inordinate deſire for riches, ſhe was ruined by the gold and ſilver mines of America, reaſon very illogically; as the ſame effect would have been

quence the induſtry of thoſe who remained behind was much ſlackened. The army, however, while the wars continued, offered a ready

been produced by the ſudden acquiſition of any other kind. —An example will beſt ſhew how theſe things may be effected.

Let us ſuppoſe that inſtead of America, Columbus had diſcovered another country of great extent, well peopled, amazingly fertile, in which the chief employment of the people was agriculture and arts, in both which they had attained great perfection.

Let us ſuppoſe that at the time of his arrival their granaries, which were conſtructed like thoſe of Joſeph, contained as much grain as would ſupply the whole inhabitants for ſeveral years. That their ſtores of wine of the moſt delicate flavour, exceeding even Tokay in richneſs, were almoſt inexhauſtible; that the quantities of oil, indigo, cochineal, ſilk, cotton, tea, coffee, chocolate, tobacco, cinnamon, cloves, mace, and many of the moſt valuable products of the earth were equally abundant: that the houſes were furniſhed in the moſt ſuperb and elegant taſte, conſiſting of mirrors of amazing magnitude and perfection, clocks, watches, &c. of the moſt curious workmanſhip: that their temples, gardens, and houſes abounded with ſtatues, buſts and vaſes of the moſt elegant kind, which might have vied with thoſe of Phydias, Buonuoretti, or Bernini; that their houſes were full of pictures of inеſtimable value: in ſhort, that the whole country was one continued ſtorehouſe of thoſe valuable things that mankind in general covet moſt, excepting gold and ſilver, not one grain of which was to be found in the whole territory; a

certain

aſylum for many, and from this cauſe was always eaſily recruited. For ſome time things went on very ſmoothly in this track; but after the

certain kind of glaſs, ſhells, and paper being the only kinds of money there known.

Let us further ſuppoſe that theſe innocent and induſtrious people were little acquainted with the art of war, and had neither implements nor diſcipline capable of making more than the moſt feeble reſiſtance to the arms and military diſcipline of Europe.

In theſe circumſtances, ſuppoſe the court of Spain lets it be known among her people, that whoever ſhall go over to that country to conquer it, ſhall obtain to himſelf a full right to the whole that he ſhall conquer, reſerving for the King only a ſmall proportion,—would not numberleſs perſons greedily fly to thoſe regions to appropriate ſuch treaſures to themſelves? And would not the court be ſuddenly enriched by its proportion of thoſe accumulated ſtores? Is it to be ſuppoſed that during theſe tranſactions many of the natives would not be maſſacred, to make way for their new maſters—or that extravagance and waſte would not abound 'till the new-found riches were exhauſted?

During the whole time that theſe ravagers were proceeding in their conqueſt, they would be daily making new acquiſitions of riches, to ſupply the waſte of thoſe that had been ſo laviſhly diſſipated. But when the whole country was ſubdued, thoſe ſtores, however abundant, would be ſoon exhauſted. Its new maſters would then be obliged to find ſome other means of ſubſiſtence. No other means of effecting this occurs but by following the employment

of

the plunder of the natives of America ceaſed, money became more ſcarce, and remittances home were leſs abundant. Treaſures muſt then

of the original poſſeſſors of the country. They muſt betake themſelves to the cultivating the ſoil from whence the treaſures had been originally obtained. The ſoil, though equally rich now as formerly, in conſequence of being ſo long neglected, has been ſuffered to run wild. Conſiderable exertions are required to bring it into its former ſtate: but the means of effecting this are not to be found. The cattle formerly employed for that uſe were killed to load the luxurious tables of the new lords of the country. The people who were formerly employed in rural labours have been cut off in a thouſand ways. The new maſters, accuſtomed to rapine, cannot be brought to ſubmit to the drudgery themſelves: in conſequence of theſe cauſes that country which uſed to abound in every valuable product, now affords but very ſcanty returns: ſlaves muſt be found to labour for the indolent owners, who muſt all be fed before the ſtate can obtain its proportion of the produce.—Since the plunder ceaſed, the revenue of the ſtate has been amazingly diminiſhed: all things are totally changed, and theſe changes muſt be ſeverely felt by every perſon concerned.

It thus appears that the phenomena complained of do not ariſe from the precious metals, conſidered as ſuch, that were found in the new world, but from the accumulated treaſures that were there found, and the rapine and devaſtation that were then permitted. The ſame effect might have been produced, had riches of any kind there abounded, and had the ſame deſtructive policy been permitted. The ſame effect would be produced by deſtroying the inhabitants,

then be dug from the mine inſtead of being wreſted from the inhabitants. So many of the natives had been killed by the wantonneſs of cruelty, that hands were wanting to work the mines to perfection. Contrivances were invented to elude the payments due to the King. In ſhort, the American revenue fell ſo far ſhort of the demands of the crown, that there was a neceſſity for endeavouring to obtain ſomewhat more from the ſubjects of Old Spain than they had formerly given.

In conſequence of the decreaſe of people in Spain, all the old taxes muſt neceſſarily have become leſs productive; and in conſequence of the decline of induſtry, they muſt likewiſe have become more oppreſſive. Inſtead, however, of removing ſome part of this heavy load, as good policy would have required, neceſſity obliged the court to impoſe new taxes. This completed the ruin of the few manufactures that remained. The inhabitants at home oppreſſed beyond what could be borne, migrated in thouſands to the colonies: the domeſtic revenue being thus in a manner

bitants, and waſting the property of the people of Britain. Plunder, when authorized, intirely deſtroys every ſpecies of induſtry. The riches thus obtained are ſoon exhauſted, nor can the ſtores when once diſperſed be eaſily replaced again.

manner annihilated, and the foreign revenue ſo conſiderably abated, mankind beheld a phenomenon perhaps the moſt unlooked for that ever happened: it was the lord of all the treaſures of the new world, and the ſovereign of the moſt extenſive dominions in Europe, a public bankrupt. From that time, the projects of ambition were obliged to be relinquiſhed, and it was ſoon found that inſtead of extending her conqueſts Spain was not able to protect her own dominions. Thoſe taxes, however, which finiſhed the ruin of her manufactures, were continued either through neceſſity or from ſhort-ſighted policy; and 'till this moment have prevented them from being re-eſtabliſhed, ſo that although Spain continues to enjoy the trade to her own colonies, that trade only encourages the induſtry of others, not that of the parent ſtate. The trade itſelf is advantageous, but it is only ſo to the merchants, and not to the body of the people. Theſe colonies are as uſeful to Europe as other colonies are, but they are not ſo to Spain. By a blindneſs of conduct that has not perhaps a parellel in hiſtory, Spain has contrived to ruin herſelf for the ſake of her colonies, and then has transferred the profits that reſult from them to other ſtates.

From this hiſtorical ſketch we perceive that Spain has been ruined by her colonies, not becauſe the inhabitants employ themſelves in ſearch of the precious metals, but becauſe of an inadvertency too common in the affairs of government. If a general idea prevails in any country that more money can be got by following one employment than any other, a great number of perſons will naturally chooſe to follow that mode of life. It was this principle that effected the ruin of Spain. A general idea prevailed, that more money could be made in the colonies of America, than at home. This opinion inſtead of being diſcouraged was favoured by the court: in conſequence of this, people of all ranks flocked thither in numbers. Thoſe left behind felt themſelves leſs comfortably ſituated than before, and their ſituation becoming leſs and leſs agreeable as their numbers decreaſed, others were gradually forced to leave their native country, for the ſake of ſubſiſtence, 'till it became reduced to that debilitated ſtate in which we now find it.

Has Britain no reaſon to fear that ſimilar evils may accrue to herſelf, in conſequence of her American colonies? It is evident the circumſtances are in many reſpects alike. In both countries an idea has prevailed, that it is eaſier to live comfortably in the colonies than at home.

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This idea has induced many individuals to leave their native homes for ever. Both kingdoms have been thus deprived of many of their beſt inhabitants: in both caſes the expences of government have been thus neceſſarily augmented. taxes, of conſequence, are heavier upon the people at home than they otherwiſe would have been, which muſt neceſſarily have a tendency to check the progreſs of manufactures; although it as neceſſarily increaſes the *appearance* of the operations of commerce. Whether this ſuppoſed increaſe is as real as it appears to be, and whether it is ſufficient to overbalance the forementioned inconveniencies, will come to be examined, after we have finiſhed the paralel between the Spaniſh and Britiſh colonies, and explained the reaſons why the latter have not produced the ſame effects upon the parent ſtate as the former.

In one reſpect the colonies of Spain differed extremely from thoſe of Britain. From the beginning, Spain drew from her colonies a conſiderable revenue: Britain has never been able to draw from her colonies any revenue at all. We have ſeen, that in conſequence of this American revenue, Spain was induced to embark in enterpriſes which made her waſte her ſtrength in fruitleſs exertions. Britain being freed from the

temptation, was preſerved alſo from the conſequences of that imprudent meaſure.

The ſame cauſes that enabled the court of Spain to draw a conſiderable revenue from her colonies *at the beginning*, tempted emigrants to go thither, at that early period, in immenſe numbers; which at once ruined the manufactures and deſtroyed the induſtry of the parent ſtate. But thoſe who went to the Britiſh ſettlements at firſt, had ſo many difficulties to overcome and hardſhips to ſtruggle with, that large ſums were obliged to be raiſed for their ſupport by the inhabitants of Britain, before they could be induced to go thither. The firſt ſettlement of theſe colonies was ſlow, and it was not 'till of late that the emigrations to them became very conſiderable. Time, therefore, has not yet been allowed for our feeling the full effects of theſe copious migrations: and as the change was effected gradually, they have not been attended with thoſe violent conſequences that ſudden changes in political arrangements never fail to produce.

To theſe conſiderations we muſt add, that ſince that period the conſtitution of Britain has experienced a revolution directly the reverſe of that of Spain. There, liberty has been changed into

into deſpotiſm, which in the moſt effectual manner prevents the people from availing themſelves of the natural advantages they poſſeſs; repreſſes the ſpirit of induſtry, and deters them from making any exertions to better their condition. Here, that deſpotic and perſecuting ſpirit which firſt gave riſe to our colonies, has been totally ſubdued, and the liberty of the ſubject ſo effectually ſecured, as to give full ſcope to every exertion of genius and induſtry. This has ſupported our manufactures and commerce in ſpite of occurrences that would have totally ruined them, if the nation had been ſubjected to the controul of any deſpotic power whatever.

Theſe are the circumſtances that have prevented Britain from experiencing a change ſimilar to that of Spain; and this is the real foundation of that flouriſhing commerce which this iſland has poſſeſſed for a century paſt; and which has been ſo often aſcribed to cauſes that have operated powerfully in retarding its proſperity.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Population and Trade of the American Colonies, and their Effects upon the Commerce, Population, and Manufactures of Great-Britain.

TRADE, it is well known, is not always or neceſſarily beneficial to the ſtate, however much it may be advantageous to individuals. It is that commerce only which tends to excite the induſtry of the people, and promote the manufactures of the country, that is beneficial to the ſtate. The commerce of Spain to her colonies, which is chiefly ſupported by the manufactures of other nations, is of very little benefit to herſelf. The commerce, however, that is carried on between Britain and her American colonies, as it conſiſts chiefly of her own manufactures, it ſeems, at firſt view, muſt prove to her highly beneficial: but in regard to trade, appearances are often deceitful; and it is proper that we proceed in the preſent inveſtigation with great circumſpection. To aſſiſt us in forming an impartial judgement on this occaſion, I ſhall put an imaginary caſe, which will perhaps enable us to ſee it more clearly than if

we

we were to rely on real facts, as theſe cannot at all times be viewed without prejudice, and are uſually in matters of this kind carefully concealed, or artfully diſguiſed.

We ſhall ſuppoſe that there exiſted a ſmall nation, ſeparated from all others by impregnable barriers, and altogether independent in matters of government. Its number of people let us call ten thouſand. Let its foreign exports, conſiſting entirely of its own products and manufactures, be ſuppoſed to amount at an average to the value of five thouſand pounds a year. In this caſe, according to the common uſe of words, the trade of the nation would be ſaid to be five thouſand pounds per annum.

In theſe circumſtances we ſhall ſuppoſe that by ſome lucky accident this people diſcovered another country, at a conſiderable diſtance from them, more extenſive, more fertile than their own, and totally unoccupied. Of this they took poſſeſſion, and ſent out of their own inhabitants to the number of one thouſand to occupy it, which number, on account of favourable circumſtances, we ſhall ſuppoſe increaſed in time to two thouſand. Theſe coloniſts, we ſhall ſuppoſe, traded with the parent ſtate, and conſumed of her manufactures annually to the value of two thouſand pounds. In this caſe, ſuppoſing her com-

commerce with other ſtates has not declined, it appears that the colonies have increaſed the trade of the mother ſtate to two-fifths more than its original value. Does it from hence follow that the parent ſtate really manufactures goods to a greater value than formerly, or carries on a more extenſive trade?—By no means. Her manufactures and trade muſt both have neceſſarily declined in conſequence of this arrangement, as will appear from the following conſiderations.

The inhabitants of the original country, we are to ſuppoſe, were fed by the produce of their own country, and cloathed with its manufactures. Each individual therefore became a cuſtomer to the nation for all he conſumed of its produce and manufactures. Hence, before we can draw any concluſion, we muſt take into the account its *in*ternal, as well as its *ex*ternal traffic. Taylors, ſhoe-makers, clothiers, dyers, and all others, muſt be fed by the farmer; and he in his turn muſt pay for every thing he purchaſes from any of them. The farmer at home who buys a yard of cloth for his own uſe, encourages the cloth manufacture as much as the Emperor of China would do, if he bought cloth to the ſame value; and the taylor who buys of the produce of the fields for his own ſuſtenance, encourages agriculture as much as the Grand Signior would do, ſhould he have occaſion to transport

port the like quantity to Conſtantinople. To the manufacturer and farmer, it is not a matter of any moment *who* it is that conſumes the produce of their labour, but what *is its amount?* The home market, therefore, is of equal importance, in proportion to its amount, as that which ariſes from a foreign demand, although from obvious cauſes, it does not furniſh equal employment to the merchant, nor makes ſuch a diſtinguiſhed figure at the cuſtom-houſe.

When we attempt to compute the amount of the internal commerce of a country, the eaſieſt way is, to eſtimate the whole value of all the articles conſumed or uſed by one perſon, at an average, in a year. This will be very different in different circumſtances. Accordingly, we find that authors have varied widely from each other in their computations of this article. The loweſt eſtimate I have ſeen rates the annual expence of one perſon at ſeven pounds, and the higheſt (I think) at twenty. Without entering into a very nice inveſtigation of this matter, it is probable we ſhall not go beyond the truth, if we place it at ten pounds a head.*

On

* All the computations of this kind I have ſeen are very erroneous, becauſe of the omiſſion of ſeveral articles that ſhould be taken into the account.

The

On that ſuppoſition, then, the trade of the original country, at the firſt mentioned period, would ſtand thus:

For food, raiment, and other neceſſaries for ten thouſand perſons at £.10 a head	£. 100,000
Value of goods exported	5,000
Total value of the products and manufactures of the country at this period	£. 105,000

At

The conſumption of the produce and manufactures of a country is to be eſtimated by the expenditure of ALL the inhabitants (deducting what goes for foreign produce) and not thoſe of any particular claſs only. Thoſe who have hitherto examined this matter, have uſually rated all as if they expended no more than the loweſt claſs of the people, which is ſurely improper.

In eſtimating the conſumption of this loweſt claſs, likewiſe, they commit a miſtake when they conſider that as equal ſimply to their own expenditure. In almoſt every caſe the employer furniſhes many articles which form a real part of their conſumption, but are no part of their own expenditure. In many manufactures, ſhop-rent, fewel, candles, tools and machinery are furniſhed by the employer, and theſe, in ſome caſes, amount to a great value.

All the animals likewiſe that are employed by man in his operations of induſtry, or for his amuſement, conſume the produce of the country, and ought to be taken into this

Ac-

At the ſecond period the account would ſtand thus, even on the ſuppoſition that its people had not increaſed at all.

For food, raiment, &c. for nine thouſand perſons at home, one thouſand having emigrated, at 10 l. a head	£.	90,000
Value of goods exported to other countries, as before		5,000
Value of goods exported to the colonies		2,000
Total value of the products and manufactures at this period	£.	97,000
Value at the firſt period as above		105,000
Difference in favour of the firſt period	£.	8,000

account. The horſes which are employed for labouring the ground form as REAL a part of the farmer's expenditure, as the wages of the ſervants who drive them. If then horſes are not themſelves to be taken into the account, the expenditure they occaſion ſhould be added to that of the perſons who employ them. The ſame may be ſaid of their tear and wear, and that of their harneſs and the machinery they work with. Theſe form the tools of a labouring man, without which he could not perform his work, although they never form any part of his own expenditure.

So that the national trade inſtead of being increaſed to the value of two thouſand pounds a year, as it appeared, has really decreaſed eight thouſand pounds a year.

It

To ſee what alteration this would produce, I ſhall ſtate the expenditure of a farmer's family, rating, as is uſual in caſes of this kind, every thing at its loweſt value.

The family, we ſhall ſuppoſe, conſiſts of the farmer, his wife, two children, ten men ſervants, and two maid ſervants, whoſe annual expenditure for food, cloathing, fewel, candles, houſe-rent, waſhing, &c. amounts on an average to ten pounds each:

Hence for 16 perſons	£. 160	0	0
Twenty horſes, the maintenance of which at 6 d. a day, is for 365 days £. 9 5 per ann. each. Hence 20 coſt	185	0	0
Tear and wear, including intereſt on the value of the horſes, 2 l. each per annum. Hence for 20	40	0	0
For ſhoes, harneſs, labouring utenſils for ditto, at leaſt	40	0	0
	£. 425	0	0

The total annual expenditure of this family (though no other article is taken into the account) could not be leſs than four hundred and twenty-five pounds, which divided by 16, leaves £. 26 11 3 for each perſon, inſtead of ten pounds, as it appears on the face of the account.

The above ſhews how fallacious muſt be all thoſe accounts which pretend to aſcertain the conſumption of the produce

It is thus that mankind are frequently impoſed on by falſe appearances in matters relating to commerce; and it is by not duly attending to all the particulars which ought to

 be

produce and manufactures of a country, by computing only the number of perſons in the country, and rating theſe at an average as only equal to the actual expenditure of the loweſt claſs of its inhabitants. Not only horſes, dogs, and other animals, which do not furniſh food for man; but cattle, ſheep, pigs, fowls, &c. ſhould all be taken into the account, as all theſe conſume of the produce of the country, and are an eſſential part of the national expenditure.

The juſteſt way to come at the truth in this caſe, would be to aſcertain what is the loweſt rate at which a perſon can be maintained in health, without begging, who conſumes only of the fruits of the earth, and who is lodged and clothed in the moſt homely and ſimple manner. This ſum may be ſuppoſed neceſſary for every perſon in the kingdom, and ſhould be conſidered as part of the annual expenditure of each.

Thoſe in circumſtances ſomewhat better, can afford to eat, beſides vegetables and grain, beef and mutton. For their uſe therefore, thoſe articles of food are produced, and to their account muſt be charged the whole annual expenditure occaſioned by the animals which afford them.

Others in more eaſy circumſtances eat ſtill more expenſively, and alſo keep horſes, dogs, &c. for their conveniency or amuſement. All that theſe animals conſume, therefore, as part of the national expenditure, muſt be charged to their account.

Beſides

be taken into the account, that ſo many plans of improvement are found at laſt to prove hurtful inſtead of being beneficial.

From

Beſides theſe, there is another article of great annual amount, viz. that which is expended by thoſe in eaſy circumſtances in fine furniture, cloathing, fewel, candles, ſtrong liquors, &c. above the proportion expended on theſe articles by the pooreſt claſs of people.

Could all theſe articles be exactly aſcertained, we ſhould obtain a tolerably juſt account of the whole amount of the national conſumption of produce and manufactures:—Without pretending to perfect accuracy, I ſhall here attempt to give a ſuperficial eſtimate of them.

The loweſt rate at which a perſon can be maintained in this iſland, in health, and without begging, including food, cloaths, lodging, furniture, waſhing, and fewel, is I think, four-pence a day, which, for 365 days, amounts to £. 6 1 8

The number of horſes I ſuppoſe to be equal to one fourth the number of people. (In the country they are much above that proportion) Theſe will conſume at an average the value of ſix-pence each a day; the 4th part of which (being what falls to the ſhare of every perſon) is three-half-pence, or per annum 2 5 7½

For wear and tear of horſes, harneſs, &c. equal to 4 l. per annum each—Hence per man 1 0 0

Carried over 9 7 3½

Brought

From the foregoing example the reader will ſee ſtill greater reaſon to doubt if the American colonies have proved as beneficial to Great-Britain as has been commonly imagined. The im-

Brought over	9	7	$3\frac{1}{2}$
Dogs, cats, rats, and every other uſeleſs creature we ſhall ſuppoſe conſume one tenth as much as the horſes, hence	0	4	$6\frac{3}{4}$
The number of cows and cattle of all ſorts will equal the number of people, and their daily conſumption may be rated at two-pence per head, which per annum is	3	0	10
Sheep may be computed to be equal in value and conſumption to the cattle, hence	3	0	10
Pigs may be rated at one fourth of the cattle, which is	0	15	$2\frac{1}{2}$
Fowls and poultry of all kinds, veniſon, &c. equal to the laſt	0	15	$2\frac{1}{2}$
Fiſh of all ſorts equal to one fourth the value of butcher's meat	1	10	9
For tools and machinery to manufacturers, elegance of furniture, richneſs of clothing, to people in higher rank, and greater waſte of fewel, candles, waſhing, &c. beyond what is conſumed by the lower claſs—ſuppoſe equal per head to	1	10	0
Total	£. 20	5	$0\frac{1}{4}$

From the whole of theſe conſiderations it appears, that the total conſumption of produce and manufactures of Britain, cannot be eſtimated at leſs than twenty pounds ſterling for each perſon at an average. It is only placed at half that ſum in the text.

importance of the trade has uſually been eſtimated by the value of the exports thither; but it is evident that many other particulars require to be taken into the account, before we can be in a condition to judge of the real effects of that trade upon the parent country.

I ſhould willingly have declined proceeding farther in this inveſtigation, had it been conſiſtent with the taſk I have undertaken. It will lead me into diſcuſſions that carry ſomewhat of an invidious appearance with regard to our American brethren. This is an ungracious taſk: but conſcious as I am that no man more cordially wiſhes to promote their proſperity than myſelf, wherever it does not interfere with the well-being of Britain, I ſhall proceed with temper and candour in this enquiry: being perſuaded that the diſcovering what is the true intereſt of both parties will in the end be for the real intereſt of the colonies as well of Britain, however much it may tend to thwart the views of both at preſent.

I begin with examining what foundation there is for an opinion that has long been entertained both in Britain and America, relating to the amazing increaſe of the people on that continent. It has been ſaid, and it is generally believed, that mankind increaſe ſo much faſter in America by

by natural procreation, than in Britain, that the diminution of the inhabitants of this country bears no ſort of proportion to their increaſe in the colonies, and that by conſequence the loſs we have ſuſtained by the ſettling of America, is much more than made up to us by the gain we reap from the commerce of the colonies.

I have examined this queſtion with attention, but have not been able to meet with any fact that tends to corroborate the opinion, unleſs it be the ſingle circumſtance of the rapid population of ſome of the provinces of America. But from this circumſtance alone, we well know, that no ſuch inference can be drawn. The inhabitants of London, Liverpool, Mancheſter, and many other places in Britain, have in like manner increaſed in a moſt rapid progreſſion; but no man, becauſe of this circumſtance, has ever believed that thoſe places are more favourable for population than others. It is on the contrary well known, that were it not for the continual ſupplies of people they conſtantly draw from the country, the inhabitants of thoſe places would probably diminiſh inſtead of increaſing. The ſame inference may be made with regard to the population of America, unleſs other facts are produced to prove a contrary opinion.

From the moſt accurate enquiry I could make, I have not met with a ſingle circumſtance that tends to *prove* that the inhabitants of America increaſe by natural procreation in the ſmalleſt degree faſter than they do in the country, and diſtant provinces of Britain. To aſcertain this fact, I have enquired after parochial regiſters; but thoſe of America could not be obtained. And if they could, unleſs they are kept with more than ordinary care, it would no tbe ſafe implicitly to rely on them.

For want of means of better information, I then had recourſe to an expedient, which the reader may eaſily adopt if he inclines: It was, to put ſome of the American refugees (who at preſent abound in this country) upon recollecting the number of children in ſuch families as they knew in America, whoſe parents were either dead, or paſt hopes of increaſing their families; and comparing theſe with an equal number of families in Britain, in ſimilar circumſtances, taken alſo at random, from the recollection of perſons who had never been out of the iſland. Upon this trial I could find no perceptible advantage on the ſide of America over the country places and diſtant provinces, (for it was to theſe places I confined my enquiry) in Great-Britain. It is not contended that very great accuracy could be obtained by this mode of enquiry; but

but it is preſumed that had the diſparity in this reſpect been near ſo great as has been contended for, a ſenſible difference muſt have been perceived even by this mode of trial.

I then had recourſe to hiſtorical records. But although I met with ſcattered notices of the numbers of the people in the different provinces at different times, yet I was not able to connect theſe into a regular progreſſive chain, or to aſcertain what proportion of the inhabitants had emigrated from Britain, or had been reared in the colonies, unleſs in the ſingle province of Virginia; with regard to which the following facts ſeem to be well authenticated.

Smith, the earlieſt and the beſt informed hiſtorian of American affairs, obſerves, that before the year 1625 there had been conveyed from England to Virginia *upwards* of nine thouſand Engliſh ſubjects, at the enormous expence of fifty thouſand pounds ſterling.* But of all this numerous emigration there remained no more alive at that period than about eighteen hundred perſons.†

* Chap. 21. † Chap. 23.

Inſtead of increaſing, therefore, it appears that during the firſt twenty years the people of that colony greatly *de*creaſed. The ſame cauſes induced a ſimilar waſte of people (though not in the ſame proportion) in all the other colonies at the beginning, and to this hour operate in a ſmaller degree on every body of emigrants who ſettle in the diſtant uncultivated parts of the colonies.

" It was a long time, ſays another hiſtorian,* before Virginia ſaw a race of Engliſh born on the ſpot."—" But after the difficulties incident to the ſettlement of colonies were in ſome meaſure ſurmounted, and the voyage thither had been ſhortened by the improvement of navigation, and rendered familiar by uſe, *whole families* tranſported themſelves thither. When the inſtructions of Charles I. gave large tracts of land to individuals, *men of conſideration and wealth*, rouſed by religion, or ambition, or caprice, removed thither; and the population of that colony had increaſed to about twenty thouſand ſouls at the commencement of the civil wars. The coloniſts enjoying plenty of good land, and ſubſiſting with eaſe, naturally increaſed abundantly; and the cavaliers reſorting thither during

* Preſent State of America, 2d. Pt. 50, apud Chalmers's Political Annals, p. 125.

during the diſtreſſes of thoſe times, Virginia contained about thirty thouſand perſons at the epoch of the reſtoration."

From theſe notices it appears, that the population of Virginia was chiefly promoted by *emigrations from Britain*. But we have not here any preciſe account either of the number of emigrants during that period, or of the proportional increaſe of the coloniſts. The following account is more diſtinct.

"We ſuppoſe, ſays Sir William Berkeley, in his Anſwer to the Enquiries of the Lords of the Committee of Colonies, anno 1671, and I am very ſure we do not much miſcount, that there are in Virginia about 40,000 perſons, men, women, and children, of which there are 2000 black ſlaves, 6000 chriſtian ſervants for a ſhort time; and the reſt have been born in the country, or have come in to ſettle or ſerve in the hope of bettering their condition in a growing country. Yearly we ſuppoſe there comes in of ſervants about 1500; of which moſt are Engliſh, few Scots, and fewer Iriſh; and not above two or three ſhips of negroes in ſeven years."*

* Political Annals of America, p. 327.

Virginia therefore contrined of inhabitants,

Anno	1625	——	1800
	1640	——	20,000
	1666	——	30,000
	1671	——	40,000

From theſe accounts it appears, that between the year 1625 and 1640, a period of fifteen years, the number of inhabitants had increaſed eighteen thouſand two hundred, which muſt in all probability have been wholly by emigrants; for it is not to be ſuppoſed that a colony in which the diminution of inhabitants for the twenty years preceding had been ſo remarkable, could all at once have come to be in a ſtate of population ſo remarkably progreſſive. It cannot even be ſuppoſed that if they had been left without any ſupply, their numbers would not rather have decreaſed. So that it is probable the emigrants from Europe during this period were conſiderably above eighteen thouſand two hundred, the total increaſe of the coloniſts; which ſeems to be confirmed by what was obſerveable in the ſubſequent period.

From the year 1640 to 1671, a period of thirty-one years, the total increaſe of the coloniſts was twenty thouſand. Towards the end of that period, Sir William Berkeley informs us, that there

there were annually imported about 1500 Europeans, beſides negroes. As Britain had been in a ſtate of tranquillity for ſome years before the time at which he wrote, a ſtop muſt have been put to the numerous emigrations of cavaliers which took place during the uſurpation. We may therefore reaſonably ſuppoſe that the number of Europeans imported at the time that Sir William wrote, muſt have been much ſmaller than formerly; ſo that inſtead of whole families of ſubſtantial people that are mentioned at a former period as having gone thither, he only mentions *ſervants* and others of inferior note. Hence I think we may be authoriſed to infer, that during the whole of this period there were imported annually, at leaſt fifteen hundred Europeans. Theſe emigrants alone, ſuppoſing their numbers had been barely kept up by natural procreation without encreaſing at all, would have amounted to 46,500 perſons; to which if we add the 2000 negroes, and the 20,000 whites that were in Virginia in the year 1640, the whole will amount to 68,500, the number of perſons that ſhould have been in the colony in the year 1671 if they had neither encreaſed nor diminiſhed. But the whole of the inhabitants at this laſt period only amounted to 40,000, ſo that inſtead of *encreaſing* in the rapid progreſſion we have been made to expect, there is the greateſt reaſon to preſume, that during this period they had decreaſed upwards

wards of 28,000, which is nearly two thirds of the then whole number of the coloniſts.

If we continue our enquiries downwards, I learn from Mr. Wynne, that at the time he wrote (about the year 1765, as I think) there were in the province of Virginia, about 170,000 ſouls, of whom 70,000 were whites, and 100,000 negroes*. From hence it appears, that in little leſs than a century, 38,000 whites (deduct the 2000 negroes) have only encreaſed to 70,000, which inſtead of a rapid encreaſe by natural procreation, as we are taught to look for, increates a very ſlow one. This, I ſay, would have been accounted a ſlow encreaſe, had there been no emigrants ſent from Europe to that province during all the beforementioned period. But it is well known that many were ſent annually, ſo many indeed, that I make no doubt, they alone would have amounted to more than all the encreaſe of the inhabitants, 300 a year would have effected this.

Hence we have little reaſon to think that the inhabitants of Virginia have ever encreaſed at all ſince they went to America by natural procreation. The climate however, in that province, is as ſalutary and the ſoil as fertile, as in any of

* Britiſh Empire in America, vol. IV. p. 247.

of the other provinces, nor are the inhabitants in any reſpect leſs favourably circumſtanced with regard to the encreaſe of their own people. But their mode of culture is leſs favourable for attracting poor coloniſts than that of moſt of the other provinces, which is the probable cauſe of the ſmall increaſe of the people there in compariſon of what is met with in ſome other parts of America.

I am far, however, from imagining that either in Virginia, or any other of the American colonies, thoſe inhabitants who are once *fully eſtabliſhed in the midſt of a cultivated diſtrict*, do not encreaſe as faſt as in any part of Europe. But as poor emigrants have always at the beginning numberleſs difficulties to encounter, and as the uncultivated ſpots on which they are obliged to ſettle, are always unwholeſome and expoſed to danger, their numbers like thoſe of the original ſettlers in Virginia, muſt ſuffer a conſiderable diminution before they can begin to encreaſe. It is in this way we muſt account in part for the retardment of the population of that fertile province, and in part by the indented ſervants ſometimes leaving that country after the term of their ſervitude is expired, to go to ſome of the other provinces where they could begin a ſettlement with a much ſmaller ſtock than in Virginia.

I ſhall

I ſhall not enter into any more minute detail on this ſubject, as theſe facts are ſufficient to ſhew, that the opinion in general entertained of the rapid encreaſe of people in America, from natural procreation, is extremely problematical if not entirely groundleſs. Indeed the great difference that is obſerved in the population of the different provinces, would alone be a ſufficient proof of the groundleſſneſs of that opinion. Where political cauſes induce emigrants to ſettle, the increaſe of the people is indeed extremely rapid. Where it is otherwiſe the population is proportionably ſlow. Juſt ſo London, Mancheſter, and Birmingham encreaſe in numbers, while the population of York, Lincoln, and Canterbury is at a ſtand.

But if the people do not encreaſe faſter in the cultivated parts in America than they do out of towns, and in the diſtant provinces in Britain, and if in the uncultivated parts of it they decreaſe conſiderably before they begin to encreaſe, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that Britain has loſt a greater number of people than America has gained ſince the firſt ſettlement of theſe colonies.

Some idea of the total amount of that change of inhabitants, and the loſs of people that has been ſuſtained thereby, may be obtained after the following manner.

It

It is in general corrupted that the natural encreaſe of mankind in a healthy country where they are well provided with the neceſſaries of life and freed from wars, peſtilence, and uncommon misfortunes, may be about two thirds of their original numbers in thirty years.

This proportion I am ſenſible is higher than is ever found to take place in any modern European ſtate, becauſe it is impoſſible to keep them free from wars and other inconveniencies that will be mentioned by and by. But in favour of America we will ſuppoſe that the inhabitants *there* encreaſe according to that ratio, without any deduction.

We cannot aſcertain the preciſe number of perſons in America at each of the periods aftermentioned, but there is reaſon to think that the following numbers are not far from the truth. Perfect accuracy is not here pretended, an approximation is all that is wanted.

I. During the firſt period of thirty years, which for the ſake of round numbers, we ſhall ſay ended at the year 1630, there is good reaſon to believe that the whole people ſettled in Britiſh America did not exceed 2,000

Brought over,	2,000
II. Between anno 1630 and 1660, theſe we ſhall ſuppoſe encreaſed by natural procreation in the above-mentioned proportion,	1,000
And by emigrants from Europe during this period,	40,000
Therefore the total inhabitants anno 1660 would be	43,000
III. Between 1660 and 1690 the natural increaſe on theſe, as above ſhould be,	28,814
And by emigrants from Europe during this period about,	100,000
Hence total inhabitants anno 1690,	171,814
IV. Between 1690 and 1720, the natural encreaſe on theſe at the abovementioned proportion would be	114,690
And by emigration during this period, ſuppoſe	220,000
Inde. The total inhabitants anno 1720.	506,504
V. Between 1720 and 1750, the natural encreaſe on theſe, at the	

above-

above-mentioned proportion would be,	337,817
And by emigration during this period, about	300,000
Inde. The total inhabitants anno 1750,	1,144,321

VI. Between 1750 to 1780, the natural increaſe on theſe at the abovementioned proportion would be,	762,362
And by emigration during this period,	600,000
Inde. The total inhabitants anno 1780,	2,506,683

The above, excluſive of the inhabitants of Canada, and not taking into the account the loſſes that have been ſuſtained by the preſent war, is probably a tolerably juſt account of the population of America, and of the manner in which it has been effected. At leaſt, if any objection can be made to this computation it muſt be that the natural encreaſe is here placed conſiderably too high; no allowance being made for loſſes by wars and otherwiſe *. But if this be too high,

* I am not ignorant that Dr. Franklin has computed, that the inhabitants of America double their numbers by natu-

high, the number of emigrants muſt be in proportion too low, ſo that no room is given to ſay the ſcal is turned againſt America.

Let us now turn our attentions to Britain, and trace the conſequences of theſe emigrations on *her* population.

It has been already ſaid, that there is reaſon to think that mankind encreaſe, as faſt by natural procreation in the diſtant provinces in Britain as they do in America. But many are the cauſes that retard the encreaſe of the number of her inhabitants, when compared with thoſe of America.

Among perſons in high life, population confeſſedly goes on more ſlowly than in lower ſtations;

natural procreation in 25 years; but for the reaſons already given, and many others, there is the greateſt reaſon to conclude he is in a miſtake. I have not his book at hand, and therefore cannot remark on his arguments.

I have alſo ſeen accounts of remarkable fecundity of particular perſons in America, mentioned from time to time in the newſpapers. I could produce many inſtances of a ſimilar kind that came within my own obſervation in Britain, were it much to the purpoſe. It was the INTEREST of the people in America to induce as many perſons as poſſible to migrate to America, and therefore it has been their ſtudy to exhibit as flattering a picture as poſſible to the public of the ſalubrity and other excellencies of their country.

ſtations; and there are a greater number of theſe to be met with in Britain than America. In towns alſo, the inhabitants do not encreaſe ſo faſt as in the country, * and Britain contains rather a greater proportion of theſe than our colonies; though the diſproportion in this reſpect is not very conſiderable. To obviate, however, all appearance of partiality on this head I ſhall ſuppoſe that one half of the whole inhabitants in Britain either live in towns, or are perſons in exalted ſtation, and that theſe never encreaſe at all, but barely ſerve to keep up their original numbers. The other half we will put on an equality with the Americans, and ſay they encreaſe at the rate of two thirds their number in thirty years.

From

* Thoſe who form a comparative eſtimate of the increaſe of people in towns and in the country, merely from the births compared with the burials in each, form a very erroneous eſtimate. Thoſe who are born in the country, and go into towns at an after period, have their births recorded in the country, but not their deaths: the births, therefore, muſt far exceed the deaths. On the contrary, theſe very perſons have their deaths recorded in the towns, but no correſponding births, which muſt make the deaths far outnumber the births, even although the children that are born in a town ſhould prove as healthy as others born in the country. No concluſion can be drawn from the comparative proportion of births and deaths in any two places, unleſs all migrations are taken into the account alſo.

From theſe, however ſtill great deductions are to be made, on account of the emigrations to America, to Ireland, and other more diſtant ſettlements, belonging to the Britiſh Empire. And on account of thoſe loſt in defence of ourſelves and of our colonies, and in carrying on our extenſive commerce to all parts of the globe.

In eſtimating the waſte of our people by our military and commercial tranſactions, it is neceſſary that w take into the account, not only the perſons themſelves who might be enrolled in either of theſe claſſes were a *cenſus* regularly taken, but thoſe alſo who are connected with and dependent upon them, who are always much more numerous than the perſons themſelves. This ſwells the account much beyond what one who is not acquainted with theſe matters would expect to find. Of this claſs of people it further deſerves to be remarked, that as they in general require to be renewed entirely once in ten years at moſt, in the following account which is divided into periods of thirty years, the whole number ſuppoſed to be employed at one time muſt be trebled.

With regard to the American emigrants, the account above given conſtitutes the baſis of that which follows. But as it appears that at the

the early periods of theſe ſettlements many more emigrants went from Britain than were taken into the account in America, there is a neceſſity of making a proper allowance on that account. We have ſeen that not above one fifth part of the emigrants formed a npermaent eſtabliſhment in America. In proportion as the colonies became more powerful this great mortality diminiſhed, till it came to the preſent ſtandard of about one half. For under the moſt favourable circumſtances for emigration, I am aſſured it never has been found that more than one half of thoſe who leave Europe have been able to ſurvive the hardſhips of a long voyage, * change of climate and poverty, ſo as to be able to form a permanent eſtabliſhment on the continent. I have made allowance for this change of circumſtances and have marked the proportion at each period.

It

* The hardſhips that poor emigrants ſuffer in going to America, are often much greater than thoſe who are unacquainted with them can eaſily ſuſpect. Ship-maſters, with a view to make profit of the ſmall freight theſe perſons are able to afford, lay in proviſions of the worſt and cheapeſt kind, and in ſuch ſmall quantities as ſubjects them to the moſt grievous diſtreſſes, if the voyage is not extremely ſhort. A little before the commencement of the preſent war, emigrations from Scotland were numerous. Some of the veſſels were put back by bad weather, after they had ſailed ſome time. The poor creatures, when they arrived, exhi-

It only needs to be further added, that at the time when the Britiſh ſettlements in America firſt began to take place, I ſuppoſe the whole inhabitants of Britain amounted to about five millions. Theſe particulars being premiſed, the following account will be ſufficiently intelligible.

I ſhall only further remark, that inſtead of dividing the inhabitants into two claſſes as abovementioned, one half increaſing two thirds of their whole number at each period, and the other half none at all. I mark it all under one, making the increaſe on the whole at each period one third, which comes exactly to the ſame thing.

I. Anno 1600, the inhabitants of Britain were by ſuppoſition about	5,000,000
Carried over	5,000,000

exhibited a pitiable ſpectacle to thoſe who beheld them. Without money, with few cloaths, and little food, they muſt inevitably have periſhed every one, but for the charitable benefactions of thoſe who had an opportunity of ſeeing them. What proportion of theſe reached America, I never could learn; but if one-fourth part of them ſurvived the voyage, and the diſeaſes contracted by it, it is more than any one who ſaw them expected.—Nor was the caſe at all uncommon.

Between

Brought over		5,000,000
Between 1600 and 1630, the increaſe on that number, according to the above proportion would be		1,666,666
Making together		6,666,666
From which muſt be deducted		
For defence and commerce, about 100,000, which multiplied by 3, gives	300,000	
By emigrations to America during this period as before, 2000, which multiplied by 5 gives	10,000	
By emigrations to all other places	50,000	
		360,000
Hence the whole amount of people in Britain anno 1630, would be		6,306,666
II. From 1630 to 1660, the natural increaſe on theſe at the above mentioned proportion would amount to		2,102,222
Making in all		8,408,888
From which deduct		
For defence and commerce, 150,000 × 3	450,000	

Brought over	450,000	
By emigrations to America, 40,000 × 4	160,000	
By ditto to Ireland and other places, ſuppoſe	300,000	
Deſtroyed by the civil wars during this period	500,000	
		1,410,000
Total people in Britain anno 1660		6,998,888
III. From 1660 to 1690, the natural increaſe on theſe as above is		2,332,962
Making together		9,331,850
From theſe deduct		
For defence and commerce, 160,000 × 3	480,000	
By emigrants to America 100 000 × 3.5	350,000	
By emigrants to other places ſuppoſe	600,000	
		1,430,000
Total inhabitants anno 1690		7,901,850
IV. From 1690 to 1720, the natural increaſe on theſe as above is		2,633,950
Making together		10,535,800

Carried over

Brought

Brought over		10,535,800
From theſe deduct		
For defence and commerce,		
250,000 × 3	750,000	
By emigrants to America,		
220,000 × 3	660,000	
By emigrants to other places		
about	850,000	
		2,260,000
Total inhabitants anno 1720		8,275,800
V. From 1720 to 1750, the natural		
increaſe on theſe as above is		2,758,600
Making together		11,034,400
From theſe deduct		
For defence and commerce,		
220,000 × 3	660,000	
By emigrants to America,		
300,000 × 3.5	750,000	
By emigrants to other ſettle-		
ments, &c.	900,000	
		2,310,000
Total inhabitants anno 1750		8,724,400
VI. From 1750 to 1780, the natural		
increaſe on theſe as above is		2,908.133
Carried over		
Making		

Making together		11,632,533
From theſe deduct		
For defence, commerce, &c.		
240,000 × 3	720,000	
By emigrants to America,		
500,000 × 2	1,000,000	
By emigrants to other places	900,000	
		2,620,000
Total inhabitants of Britain, anno 1780		9,012,533

I do not pretend to ſay that in the above calculation either the numbers or the proportions are *preciſely* exact. They are acknowledged to be taken by conjecture as near the truth as could be gueſſed at to ſerve as a clue to direct in forming a judgement on this head. Nor could a ſmall variation on ſome particular circumſtances affect the general concluſions deducible from theſe data. It may make the exceſs be a little more or leſs; but the mode of progreſſion will be the ſame. The population of any ſtate muſt undoubtedly be retarded in conſequence of emigrations from thence; and the numbers of her people be diminiſhed in proportion to the number that ſhall be wanted in her defence. If her territories lie compact, and are defended by natural barriers that make the at-

tacks

tacks of her enemies extremely difficult, the waſte of people in her defence will be out of all proportion ſmaller than if her territories are of immenſe extent, thinly inhabited and expoſed to danger in a variety of quarters, ſo far diſtant from each other as not to admit of timely aſſiſtance from one to another in caſe of danger.

By the foregoing eſtimate, it ſeems that the loſs to Britain ariſing from all theſe cauſes, does not yet quite equal the natural encreaſe by procreation, and that there is reaſon to think the population of Britain is ſtill in a progreſſive ſtate, though that progreſſion is much ſlower than it would have been, but for the many emigrations that have taken place to our colonies. It is plain, however, that ſhould the emigrations be permitted to go on encreaſing a little longer, they would ſoon exceed the natural encreaſe, after which period, ſhould the ſame cauſes continue to operate, our population would not only be retarded, it would ſtop, and ſoon after proceed to decreaſe almoſt in a geometrical progreſſion, which would quickly bring us into a condition nearly ſimilar to that of Spain. But it is to be hoped the good ſenſe of the nation will ward off this threatened calamity.

Should the inquiſitive reader be deſirous of puſhing his enquiries a little farther, and drawing

ing a parallel between what Britain now is, and what ſhe probably would have been, he has before him the materials for ſatisfying himſelf on theſe heads. Were I not afraid of tiring my readers with long and diſguſting calculations, I ſhould have proceeded to ſtate this one as fully as the others. For theſe reaſons, I ſhall only here obſerve, that if he were to take the trouble of running over the laſt account, with no other alteration than barely to omit the article of emigrations to America, and to make a deduction of one third on the article defence, he would find that the number of inhabitants in Britain ſhould at this time have amounted to better than fourteen millions and a half. If ſo, it is evident that Britain by peopling her American colonies, has loſt about five millions and a half of inhabitants, while her colonies have gained only two millions and a half. This is a miſerable waſte of the human ſpecies, but which by being gradual and ſlow, has eſcaped the notice of ordinary obſervers.

If he were further to enquire what effect this change has produced in regard to the trade and induſtry of Britain, the account would ſtand thus.

The whole exports to America on an average of ten years preceding 1770, according to Sir Charles Whitworth's tables, (omitting fractions) amounted

amounted to the value of £. 2,300,000. On the other hand, the annual conſumption of five millions and a half of people at home, at the rate of ten pounds a head, would have been £. 55,000,000. So that without making any allowance for the ſurplus of produce and manufactures, that would naturally have been exported to other countries, if Britain had poſſeſſed this numerous population, it appears that her induſtry ſuffers a diminution to the annual value of upwards of fifty two millions ſterling, after allowing the American commerce to be rated at much more than the utmoſt value it ever was known to attain.

By the ſame mode of reaſoning it will appear that if theſe colonies ſhould be allowed to continue to encreaſe *after the ſame manner* as formerly, and if, in conſequence thereof, our exports thither ſhould encreaſe in the ſame proportion, yet this encreaſing value of the American trade, inſtead of indicating an encreaſing conſumption of Britiſh produce and manufactures, and by conſequence affording an additional *ſtimulus* to our national induſtry, would indicate directly the reverſe, becauſe our home conſumption would decline as it encreaſed nearly in the proportion of twenty to one.

From theſe conſiderations I am compelled to draw this general concluſion. That our American colonies, inſtead of augmenting the trade and induſtry of Britain, have tended greatly to diminiſh them both.

Nor can this general concluſion be invalidated by any trifling error in the particulars of the foregoing account; for I muſt here again repeat it, that a little *more* or *leſs* in a caſe of this kind is of no moment, if the general principles are truly explained. If, inſtead of fifty millions it could be made appear, that the loſs ſhould have been ſtated at twenty, at ten, at five, the general concluſion muſt ſtill remain the ſame. I myſelf believe that the caſe is nearly as it is here repreſented; but if another ſhould find reaſon to think that the reſult ſhould be either a little higher or a little lower, than I have made it, we have no occaſion to differ on that account. My aim is not here to ſettle with exact preciſion the amount of the balance, but to ſhew clearly towards which ſide it turns.

Nor ſhould we be ſo far dazzled with the preſent brilliancy in the appearance of our commerce, as to think there can be nothing real in theſe ſuggeſtions. Nothing is more common than for nations as well as individuals to make a greater brilliancy of appearance for a time, in

conſequence

conſequence of a deranged œconomy than they could have done without it. That man, who amidſt the giddy whirl of diſſipation takes no time to examine into the ſtate of his affairs, but meets with a complaiſant banker who readily advances money upon mortgage whenever it is demanded, lives with much greater eaſe and ſplendor than he otherwiſe could have done. He perceives not that the ſource of his wealth are daily diminiſhing with an encreaſing rapidity, nor thinks that in a ſhort time he will be involved in the moſt pitiable diſtreſs. In like manner Portugal for a time carried on the moſt brilliant commerce, by means of her numerous ſettlements in almoſt every corner of the globe. She did not in due time perceive the conſequence of ſuch extended views. At laſt, however ſhe ſeverely felt, that the waſte of people neceſſary for conducting theſe vaſt enterpriſes, thinned her native country of its beſt inhabitants, and reduced her to that exhauſted ſtate in which we now behold her. Spain, alſo, adopted a mode of colonization nearly ſimilar to our own, and intoxicated with the benefits ſhe *thought* ſhe derived from it, enquired not into the real tendency of ſuch meaſures till it was too late. Before ſhe even ſuſpected ſhe was in a declining ſtate, her declenſion had advanced ſo far that it was no longer poſſible for her to recover herſelf. What law in nature is

there that tends to guard Britain from a ſimilar fate if ſhe ſhall purſue a ſimilar conduct? And what argument can be adduced to ſhew that ſhe is not now in a ſimilar ſtate of precarious glory? The population of Britain, there is reaſon to think, has hitherto continued to advance a little. In conſequence of this, and other concurring cauſes, many of her manufactures have yet been able to keep their ground. Her vigour is yet great, but ſhe ſtands upon the top of the wheel. Should it take a little turn. Should the time arrive that her population begins to decline, the ruin of her manufactures muſt quickly follow, in which event no human power could prevent her from ſinking into a greater ſtate of debility than has ever been experienced by any other European ſtate. Let us not then neglect the preſent favourable moment which affords us ſuch a happy opportunity of repairing paſt errors, and of giving ſtability to the ſtrength and induſtry as well as to the conſtitution of the ſtate. The genius of Britain calls out,

TIME NOW IS: may the period never arrive when ſhe ſhall pronounce theſe awful words, AND TIME SHALL BE NO MORE *.

CHAP.

* This alludes to a popular alchemical tradition. After the proceſs had been watched for many years, the tradition

CHAP. V.

Of the effects of the American colonies on Great Britain, with regard to civil Liberty, War and Taxes.

IN forming a judgment concerning the expediency of any political meaſure, it is neceſſary that we ſhould not only attend to the effects that ſeem immediately to ſpring from it, but alſo trace thoſe diſtant conſequences which by not being obviouſly connected with it are ſometimes thought to be entirely independent of it. A judicious miniſter will ſometimes effect his purpoſe by meaſures that *appear* to have a direct contrary tendency; and a nation is very often ruined by the very meaſures that have an apparent tendency to promote its proſperity.

This

dition goes, that when it arrived at the exact point of perfection, a voice was heard to ſay TIME IS, which if not attended to, was heard again to ſay TIME WAS, and in a little while it pronounced aloud in the moſt awful tone, AND TIME SHALL BE NO MORE. The laſt uſually awakened the diſconſolate operator; who, overcome with watching, had fallen into a ſleep too profound to be awakened by the two former more gentle calls.

This maxim is in no caſe more frequently verified than in what relates to the extenſion of empire. To the bulk of mankind nothing ſeems ſo much to forward the proſperity of a ſtate, and to add to its ſtability, as the enlarging of its territories, and the ſubjecting to its power ſome neighbouring ſtate: yet this very circumſtance has proved the deſtruction of more ſtates than any other that could be named. The reaſons why a bare extent of territory without a proportional encreaſe of people proves always pernicious, have been already in ſome meaſure explained: but there are other evils that flow from the ſame cauſe that muſt now be taken into the account.

If manufactures and commerce depend in a great meaſure on the liberty of the ſubject, it muſt follow, that whatever has a tendency to endanger that liberty ſhould be carefully guarded againſt in a free ſtate. Conſidered in this light, extended empire can ſeldom prove favourable to a commercial ſtate. Where there are large dominions many are the places of profit that come to be in the diſpoſal of government; and the means of accumulating wealth without the exertions of induſtry are increaſed. Fortunes are thus ſuddenly acquired, which by introducing a great diſparity between the condition of individuals of the ſame claſs, encou-

rages

rages on one hand a ſpirit of dependence and diſſipation, while it equally diſcourages a ſpirit of induſtry, moderation, and content. Many men who might have been uſeful members of ſociety loſe the beſt of their days idle expectancy, and remain for ever poor and dependent. Others, having acquired riches by means that perhaps would not bear the ſtricteſt ſcrutiny, have an intereſt to ſupport the court, whoſe favour can moſt effectually ſcreen from danger. In ſhort, whoever has much to give muſt neceſſarily obtain many dependents; in proportion to the extent of affairs will be the temptation to abuſe, and where there is abuſe by thoſe entruſted with command, a ſervile reſpect will be paid to the ſupreme executive power. It is from the operation of theſe cauſes that the liberties of Europe have gradually begun to diſappear as the kingdoms became more extenſive: and it was thus that the court of Spain in particular, at a very early period after ſhe obtained poſſeſſion of America, found herſelf enabled to trample upon the ancient privileges of that free and haughty people.

The conſtitution of Britain will effectually guard againſt a deſpotiſm under the ſame form with that of Spain; but many are the ways in which the ſame cauſe may operate deſtructive effects upon a trading nation. Every circumſtance,

ſtance, therefore, which tends to facilitate the ſudden acquiſition of money by court favour, ſhould be guarded againſt with care, as endangering the liberty of the ſtate. In this ſenſe, extended empire muſt ever prove pernicious.

But it is not on this account alone that our connection with the American ſettlements is to be dreaded. The temptation it affords for frequent wars, is a ſource of ſtill greater miſchiefs to a free, commercial, and manufacturing ſtate.

Of all the ſcourges to which mankind are ſubjected, war is doubtleſs the moſt conſiderable. It not only ſweeps away by a premature death numbers of the human ſpecies, but it often paves the way for ſuch miſeries to the ſurvivors, as makes the lot of thoſe who fell in battle worthy of envy. To develope all the miſchiefs that flow from it would require a more maſterly pen than mine; a few of its moſt obvious effects, and ſuch as more nearly affect the object of our preſent diſquiſition, may be ſhortly delineated.

During the continuance of war, the national expence is greatly augmented; and in the confuſion that neceſſarily ariſes from its numerous operations, a wide door is opened for accumulated frauds and abuſes. Fortunes thus come

to be acquired with a rapidity, and to an extent unknown at other periods: and this being foreſeen, makes every needy expectant in the nation look forward with joy to the period when it ſeems to approach, and do every thing he can to accelerate it.

Nor is the idle and the needy dependents on the court only, who look forward with pleaſure to the approach of war: monied men behold it with equal joy. They foreſee that the wants of government will ſoon be ſuch as to demand their aſſiſtance. To inſure that, they know they will be placed in ſuch a ſituation, as ſhall permit them to avail themſelves to the utmoſt of thoſe treaſures, towards the accumulation of which their thoughts are chiefly directed. I forbear to point out the various arts which this claſs of men have deviſed for profiting by the exigencies of the public. It ſhall ſuffice for me here to obſerve, that they are ſo well known in Britain as moſt effectually to inſure their concurrence to every meaſure that can tend to protract the war.

From the influence of theſe two powerful claſſes of men, aided by the national folly, which ever graſps at extended dominion, a wiſe and good miniſter, were he willing, dares hardly liſten to terms of accommodation, 'till the nation

tion is involved in ſuch miſery as prevents a poſſibility of advancing farther. All other claſſes of men, indeed, ſo quickly feel the inconveniencies of war, that were they capable of making themſelves heard as well as the money-lenders, or were they as good judges of what promotes their own intereſt, they would ſoon put a ſtop to its career.

In conſequence of the exorbitant profit to be made by money in the capital during war, all that can poſſibly be raiſed is carried thither. Money lent in the moſt diſtant corners of the country, for the purpoſes of induſtry or commerce, is recalled. This narrows the circle of credit in an amazing degree, and ſlackens the hand of induſtry in proportion. Manufactures decline, and poverty in the remote provinces is experienced to a diſtreſſing exceſs. Many are thus forced to leave their native homes, the ſeats of ſober induſtry, and haſten to the capital, where they become fit tools for miniſtering to the wants of diſſipation and of guilt, and are loſt for ever as uſeful members of the community.

It is thus that war, while it deſtroys with wonderful rapidity the induſtrious part of the nation, increaſes almoſt in the ſame proportion the number of its uſeleſs, its deſtructive members. By drawing the whole money towards the

the capital, and a few other places, its circulation is confined. It involves the provinces in miſery, while it overwhelms the court and its dependents with riches, and buries them in diſſipation. National wealth, to thoſe who judge only from the capital, is increaſing; while in truth, want and indolence are approaching with haſty ſtrides.

Such are the natural, and neceſſary conſequences of war. How careful then ſhould every wiſe ſtate be to avoid placing herſelf in a ſituation that may give frequent opportunities for the worthleſs part of her people, by impoſing upon the fooliſh, to involve her in war.—But extent of empire in every caſe, affords numberleſs temptations to engage in war; and an empire extended like the Britiſh empire in America, is peculiarly liable to this defect. It at the ſame time diminiſhes our ſtrength, and expoſes us to danger. Was it for the intereſt of Britain to drain herſelf of men, to people thoſe vaſt deſarts, when ſuch effects might naturally be expected to flow from it?

But it is not by the unequal circulation of money only, nor by the temporary ſuſpenſion of credit, that war and extended empire prove hurtful to a manufacturing kingdom. The money then expended forms a heavy load of debt,

which continues to depreſs induſtry and retard manufactures long after the war is ended. The ſums too that are acquired during peace to command reſpect, and to give ſecurity to our widely extended provinces, are of themſelves ſo great, as to be alone a heavy burthen. Both together cannot fail to be attended with the moſt ſerious conſequences.

Taxes neceſſarily enhance the price of manufactures, and by conſequence depreſs the induſtry and diminiſh the trade of a manufacturing and commercial nation in proportion to their amount. This propoſition is ſo generally aſſented to, as to need no illuſtration here. And as the expence of government muſt now-a-days be entirely defrayed by taxes, it follows that whatever increaſes the expence of government, muſt augment the taxes upon the ſubjects of the ſtate.

But if, with the expence of government the number of the people increaſes in an equal proportion, the ſame taxes will become more productive, ſo as to anſwer the exigencies of the ſtate without preſſing more heavily upon any individuals, or diſcouraging manufactures in the ſmalleſt degree. If, on the contrary, that expence be greatly augmented, while the people do not increaſe nearly in the ſame proportion,

new

new taxes become neceſſary. Every individual muſt contribute more to the ſtate than formerly. The price of manufactures muſt be enhanced, and the foreign demand muſt be diminiſhed in proportion.

From hence it appears, that as the great buſineſs of a modern miniſter is to contrive ways and means for defraying the expence of government, without diſcouraging the agriculture or manufactures of a ſtate, one effectual method of attaining that end is to promote as much as poſſible the population of the kingdom.

Since the diſcovery of America, this mode of augmenting the national revenue ſeems to have been entirely overlooked in Europe. In conſequence of our ſettlements on that continent, the national expence has prodigiouſly augmented, and in proportion to that augmentation has our population been retarded. At the firſt period, five millions of people paid by taxes to the amount of one million and a half per annum; which amounted to about ſix ſhillings a head. At preſent nine millions of people pay fifteen millions per annum*, or about one pound fourteen

* Dr. Price computes the whole amount of the taxes levied on the people of Great Britain to be about 15 millions, excluſive of poor rates, turnpikes, &c. &c. Obſervations on Civil Liberty, 9th edit. Appendix.

teen ſhillings a head, which is almoſt ſix times the former ſum. A diſproportion which has raiſed the price of our manufactures and retarded their ſale in every market to which they can be ſent. An evil this that has been often felt and complained of, though little care has been beſtowed to diſcover the ſource from whence it ſprings, or to guard againſt the effects that may naturally be expected from it.

The amount of our taxes has indeed afforded a ſubject for much declamation; but the cauſes of the great encreaſe of the national expence which occaſions theſe taxes, has ſeldom been thought of. The preſſure of our taxes has been complained of, but it has not been ſuggeſted that this preſſure has been greatly augmented in conſequence of the paucity of our people, which has been in a great meaſure occaſioned by the emigrations to America, and our exertions in its defence. When our manufacturers have been thrown out of employment, from a ſtagnation of demand in foreign markets, occaſioned by the circumſtances abovenamed, inſtead of contriving means to alleviate their burthens, and to furniſh them with employment at home, allurements have been held out to entice them to the colonies, where taxes were hardly known and protection has been afforded *gratis*. It does not ſeem to have been adverted to by thoſe who promoted

promoted theſe meaſures, that in conſequence of the migrations ariſing from theſe cauſes, the taxes on thoſe behind would require to be augmented, and that of courſe, the evil complained of would be encreaſed, and greater migrations become neceſſary; which, if the ſame conduct is to be obſerved, muſt go on encreaſing till the total depopulation of the ſtate puts a ſtop to them.

Had our people inſtead of being enticed to go to America, been kept at home and encouraged to proſecute manufactures with vigour, we ſhould have been at once freed of all the expence that has been laid out in the ſettlement and defence of that country, which can hardly be reckoned leſs than one half the whole national expence; inſtead of twenty millions our expenditure would in that caſe, have in all probability, ſcarce amounted to ſix millions a year; and inſtead of nine millions of people, we ſhould, in all probability, have poſſeſſed fifteen. In that caſe, our whole taxes, inſtead of forty-four ſhillings and five-pence, would not have amounted to more than ſeven ſhillings and ſix-pence a head. I leave any one to judge what encouragement our manufactures would receive, were ſuch an abatement of our taxes at preſent to take place, or rather to conſider what encouragement our manufactures would have received in regard to

foreign

foreign trade, eſpecially had ſuch a riſe in our taxes never taken place. In that caſe we ſhould not have been obliged to have had recourſe to monopolies and other ſimilar contrivances to ſupport our decaying manufactures, but would have found a ready ſale in the world at large for all we could have produced, without the aid of any cumpulſory means whatever.

CHAP. VI.

Of the effects of the monopoly of the American trade on the manufactures and commerce of Great Britain.

IN conſequence of the cauſes that have been enumerated in the laſt chapter, and others that ſhall ſoon be mentioned, the price of many of the manufactures of Britain has been ſo much enhanced, that they have not been able to ſtand a competition with the manufactures of other nations in foreign markets, and our trade in thoſe articles has greatly declined. Our trade to the Levant in woollen cloths, which was once an object of great national importance, has dwindled to nothing, ſince the French and the

Dutch

Dutch have there become our competitors in that article; and the ſale of our woollen manufactures in Germany and the Baltic has, from the ſame cauſes greatly declined. To prevent the total downfal of that favourite national manufacture, no better expedient has been deviſed than to obtain a monopoly in the trade for woollen manufacture in all places in which we have had influence enough to effect it. This is the caſe in regard to Portugal, our colonies in America, and Britain itſelf: from all which places we have endeavoured by every device we could contrive to exclude the woollen manufactures of other nations. But ſmall are the advantages that are derived from ſuch deſpicable expedients as this.

A monopoly of trade is always a favourite meaſure among merchants, becauſe it tends directly to enrich the immediate monopoliſt. Yet it ſeldom happens that a nation is benefited *upon the whole* by a monopoly of trade; and it always happens that a monopoly of any branch of manufacture proves in the end extremely prejudicial to the intereſts of the community which obtains it. The reaſons of this will be ſufficiently obvious to any one who reflects but ſlightly upon the ſubject.

The

The manufacturer who finds himſelf freed from the concurrence of a competitor in the market, will naturally take leſs pains to have his goods made perfect in their kind, than he would have taken, had he dreaded the preference that might have been given to the goods of his rival.

The merchant likewiſe, when he finds that his cuſtomers cannot be ſupplied by any other than himſelf, demands and obtains a higher profit than he otherwiſe could have got.

No goods being returned or ſold below prime coſt in this market, both merchants and manufactures obtain very great profits for a time; and neither of them once think of the perfection of the goods, but merely how they may get them made at as ſmall a price as poſſible, and thus augment their profits.

Things go on in this train for ſome time, till the workmen acquire a ſlovenly manner of working, that renders their goods leſs fit for other markets than they uſed to be. The maſter manufacturers thus finding their profits very conſiderable, wiſh, each of them, to poſſeſs as much of this lucrative buſineſs as poſſible; to obtain which they give a little more wages to their workmen than formerly. Other manufacturers

facturers to ſecure their buſineſs are obliged to give as much. Thus do they go on gradually outbidding one another till the wages raiſe ſo high that, that with all the advantages of the monopoly, no more money can be made by that branch of buſineſs than by any other.

Here however, it is obſervable, that the great profits which were at firſt divided between the maſter manufacturer and the merchant, gradually paſs from them and come in time to be appropriated by the labouring manufacturers; who by thus obtaining more money than is neceſſary to maintain them in their former frugal mode of living, either work leſs, or acquire a taſte for a more luxurious mode of living. In either caſe the effect upon the manufacture is the ſame. What was at firſt a mere gratuitous price, demanded only with a view to augment the profits of trade, comes at length to conſtitute a part of the price of the manufacture itſelf. Had that exorbitent profit never been demanded, the manufacture could have been carried on as formerly at its old low price; but ſo ſoon as this profit forms a part of the price of the goods they never will, nor indeed can be afforded lower, for reaſons that ſhall bye and bye he made manifeſt.

It is a peculiarity attending political regulations, that if the œconomy is deranged in one particular inſtance, it is immediately communicated through the whole, and equally effects every department. Thus, in the caſe now under conſideration, the particular manufacture alluded to, yielding higher profit to thoſe employed in it than could be obtained in others, neceſſarilly raiſes the wages of all other manufactures, till they become as high as in this branch. The ſame thing happens with labourers in agriculture; which proportionally raiſes the price of the neceſſaries of life. By this tranſition the profit goes from the manufacturer to the labourer and landlord, where it reſts. In this manner does every monopoly of manufacture naturally operate ſo as to raiſe the price of all the manufactures in the kingdom, and by conſequence diminiſh the demand for them from the world at large where a free trade is allowed.

The free market for manufactures thus coming gradually to decay, the manufacturers turn their attention chiefly to the monopoly market. The price of the goods to themſelves is now higher than formerly; it muſt, by conſequence be alſo higher to the conſumers. The purchaſers learn in time that they might be ſupplied cheaper from other markets. They complain.

But

But theſe complaints if the monopoliſts have power will procure them no redreſs. Attempts are made to elude the law that ſecures the monopoly. Severer laws are deviſed to enforce the former. The monopoliſts and conſumers thus become ſecret and bitter enemies to each other. As the temptation to elude the laws become ſtronger, a contraband trade takes place, which no human power can ever prevent when the profit by it is conſiderable. In conſequence of this demand for the manufacture even to this market gradually declines, and none other can be found. Manufacturers thus thrown out of employment muſt either beg or ſtarve, or leave the country. A miſerable choice, but a neceſſary one in ſuch a caſe, unleſs meaſures ſhall have been previouſly taken to guard againſt this great evil.

Had the monopoly of the trade to our American colonies been as really efficacious as many ſeem to think it was, conſequences ſimilar to the above muſt long ago have been experienced: but luckily for Britain means were found by the coloniſts from the beginning to elude the force of theſe reſtraints in many eſſential articles, while the bulk of the nation believed they were ſtrictly complied with. Theſe circumſtances however were always very well known to the miniſters of Great Britain, but whether through

indolence, or from whatever other motives I pretend not to ſay, they were winked at; till of late, when an attempt to reform this, along with ſome other internal abuſes that had long prevailed in the colonies, lighted up the civil war that rages at preſent: war that has been carried on with ſuch pertinacity, as muſt prove highly prejudicial to both parties, and which will probably end in a conſiderable alteration in the circumſtances of both. How far this alteration may be advantageous to either party, it is impoſſible to aſcertain until the alteration has actually taken place. But it behoves every one concerned to look forward with a view to point out ſuch circumſtances as may lead to a ſettlement as little prejudicial to either party as poſſible.

From this minute ſurvey of the foregoing particulars, it appears, that in every point of view in which we have conſidered the ſubject, the Intereſt of Great Britain has been hurt by the eſtabliſhment of her North American colonies. This concluſion is, however, ſo contrary to the opinion of political writers in general, and to the prepoſſeſſions of the people of this country at large, that it will undoubtedly be by many deemed erroneous. In theſe circumſtances, however much I myſelf may be convinced of the ſufficiency of the foregoing arguments

ments to authoriſe the concluſion; yet the reſpect that is in all caſes due to the judgment of the many when oppoſed by an individual, induces me to examine with candour ſuch other arguments as I have heard adduced in favour of the beneficial conſequences that are ſuppoſed to have reſulted to Britain from the colonies now under conſideration.

CHAP. VII.

Miſcellanons obſervations on the importance of the American colonies to Great Britain conſidered.

I. IT is alledged, "That the trade of Great "Britain to her American colonies is an "object of great magnitude: that it has gra- "dually encreaſed with the encreaſe of inhabi- "tants in the colonies, till at laſt it has become "nearly equal to the whole exports from Eng- "land to the world at large, before theſe colo- "nies were planted. From hence it is contend- "ed, that had it not been for theſe colonies "the commerce of the parent ſtate would not

"now

" now have been of much more than half its " preſent value."

It is not denied that the value of the exports to America, appear from the cuſtom houſe books, to bear a very large proportion to that of the whole exports from Britain about two hundred years ago ; but it does not from hence follow, either that the commerce of Britain is nearly doubled ſince that period, or, ſuppoſing it has been doubled, that this would not have taken place, although the colonies had never exiſted.

With regard to the firſt of theſe poſitions, it has been already ſhewn, that if the exports to our colonies have encreaſed, the home conſumption of our own produce and manufactures muſt have decreaſed in a much greater proportion. The greater therefore the amount of theſe exports, the greater muſt be the decreaſe of our manufactures *upon the whole*, although the particular branch of commerce that ranks under the head of *foreign* trade has encreaſed. Unfortunately this is the only branch of trade that ſeems to be attended to by modern political writers. Such has not always been the caſe. About the beginning of this century a political miſcellany was publiſhed, entitled *The Britiſh Merchant*, under the immediate inſpection

ſpection of Mr. Gee, Sir Joſiah Child, Sir Theodore Janſſen, and others of the moſt diſtinguiſhed rank in the political and mercantile line, whoſe ſentiments on this ſubject the author expreſſes thus.

"The firſt and beſt market of England are "the natives and inhabitants of England." and he further computes "that all our foreign mar-"kets cannot be equal to *one twentieth part* of "our own for taking off our native product and "manufactures." *

"It remains therefore, continues he, as I ſaid "at firſt, that our own conſumption, the con-"ſumption of our own people, are the beſt and "greateſt market for the product and manufac-"tures of our own country."

"*The preſervation and encreaſe of this market,* "*ought therefore to be the thing principally attend-*"*ed to.*" †

How far this maxim has been attended to by thoſe who have ſo much encouraged the ſettlement of America by our own people, every one is left to determine for himſelf. The very reſpectable

* Britiſh merchant, vol. 1. p. 165.
† Ibid. vol. i. p. 167.

reſpectable authority, I have here produced in ſupport of the arguments before made uſe of, will free me from the imputation of maintaining opinions either novel or paradoxical. But to return,

Neither does it follow, that if we never had poſſeſſed any ſhare of the American trade, our exports and foreign commerce would not have encreaſed. The contrary ſeems demonſtrable. Since the period mentioned, the liberties of Britiſh ſubjects have been ſecured, and their rights reſpected in a much higher degree than formerly; in conſequence of which their exertions in manufactures and commerce have been much greater than heretofore. From theſe cauſes, our foreign trade, excluſive of that to our colonies, has increaſed to nearly three times its former amount. Had our people, inſtead of going to America, remained at home, our manufacturers would have been far more numerous than at preſent. Had we been freed of the expence of protecting them, our taxes would have been the fewer, and their preſſure upon induſtry much leſs ſevere. Had we never experienced the deſtructive effects of the American monopoly, our labour would have been leſs expenſive, and our manufacturers more induſtrious. From all theſe conſiderations it is obvious, that our manufactures in general could have been afforded much

cheaper

cheaper than at preſent: in conſequence of which they would have found a ready vent in thoſe nations where our commerce has declined, becauſe of the circumſtances already enumerated. The probability therefore is, that our foreign trade, as well as our internal commerce would have increaſed to a much greater degree than it has done, had it not been for our American colonies.

II. "It is not uncommon to find authors "who with a view to demonſtrate the import- "ance of the colonies, enter into a pompous de- "tail of all the benefits that flow from trade; "the whole of which they pretend that Britain "derives from her colonies: inferring from "thence, that if we had not been poſſeſſed of "theſe colonies, we never could have experi- "enced any of thoſe benefits."

To anſwer ſuch an argument as this requires an apology; but in a country like Britain, where all mankind claim a right to decide on national affairs, it is neceſſary ſometimes to prove ſuch propoſitions, as that two and two are greater than three. To paſs over an argument is by ſome believed to imply a tacit acknowledgement that it is unanſwerable.

On this occaſion, without attempting to reaſon, I would obſerve, that experience fully refutes the argument. According to the above reaſoning, Spain, which poſſeſſes the moſt extenſive colonies of any European power, ſhould likewiſe enjoy the moſt extenſive commerce: while Holland, whoſe trade to her own colonies (were it to do no more than ſupply their own demands, could eaſily be managed by one ſingle veſſel) ſhould poſſeſs next to no trade at all. The fact however, is directly the reverſe. Holland, which poſſeſſes ſcarce any colonies,* carries on a very extenſive and lucrative commerce, whereas the trade of Spain is ſmall, and is, *to her*, rather deſtructive in its conſequences. In Holland, manufactures flouriſh, though ſhe has no extenſive market abroad of her own people to whom ſhe can ſend them. In Spain they languiſh, although ſhe has a moſt extenſive territory in America peopled with her own ſubjects, who depend on Europe for a great part of their manufactures, and to whoſe trade ſhe claims an excluſive title.

From theſe facts it is evident that neither trade nor manufactures are inſeparably connected with colonies. Britain enjoys a great trade, and carries on conſiderable manufactures, while ſhe likewiſe poſſeſſes extenſive colonies. This however

* I dot reckon her poſſeſſions in the Eaſt Indies colonies, properly ſo called.

ever does not imply but ſhe might have enjoyed a ſtill more extenſive trade, and more flouriſhing manufactures without any colonies at all, had circumſtances concurred to produce that effect.

III. "Our American colonies have been likewiſe held up to public view, as the ſole cauſe of that ſuperiority at ſea which is poſſeſſed by Britain, without which ſhe muſt have ever remained an inconſiderable ſtate, perpetually expoſed to inſults from her more powerful neighbours."

But is it not merely in conſequence of an extenſive trade, that any ſtate can ever be enabled to acquire a ſuperiority at ſea? And has it not been juſt now ſhewn that trade is not neceſſarily connected with colonies? If ſo, neither can naval power be neceſſarily dependent on them. In fact, Britain poſſeſſed the ſuperiority at ſea before ſhe had any colonies at all. Spain never enjoyed it, although ſhe has always had more extenſive colonies than any other European power. The Dutch, when they applied their minds to war, without poſſeſſing a ſingle inch of territory beyond the bounds of their own marſhes, beat the Spaniards in every part of the globe. It is not, therefore, colonies that enſure

a ſuperiority at ſea. It is other circumſtances that may or may not be connected with them.

IV. " Others have contended that our Ame-
" rican colonies have been of immenſe advantage
" to Britain, merely by preventing France or
" Spain from occupying theſe fertile regions and
" becoming our rivals in trade."

But ſuppoſing it could be proved that the trade thither would have been of as much conſequence to thoſe nations, or to us, as it is here ſuppoſed, would it not have been poſſible to have ſecured it to ourſelves, by erecting proper forts along the coaſt, without adopting the idea of peopling the country? This has been done in Hudſon's bay, in Africa, and in Aſia, with an infinitely ſmaller expence and waſte of people. Why might not the ſame have been done in America? The anſwer is eaſy. The trade with the natives would not have been worth even that expence, ſmall as it might have been. But if the commerce with the natives was not worth the expence of ſtrong factories along the coaſt, it was of ſmall conſequence who had taken poſſeſſion of it. And if theſe deſarts were to be peopled by the ſubjects of any European ſtate, it has been already ſhewn, that the trade and manufactures of that ſtate would be much hurt, and its internal riches and ſtrength greatly diminiſhed thereby. It was not therefore our

intereſt to prevent either the French or the Spaniards from taking poſſeſſion of it, and peopling it, if they had been ſo diſperſed, we ought rather to have promoted this deſign, if we meant to avail ourſelves of their diſtractions and internal weakneſs.

V. "Others have contended, that in a country "where luxury is ſo far advanced as in Britain, "there muſt always be ſome perſons of deſperate "fortunes, who, by being unable to earn a com-"fortable ſubſiſtence at home, are deſirous of "going to ſome diſtant country, where they may "begin life, as it were, upon a new plan, with-"out being under the eye of their old acquaint-"ances. In theſe circumſtances it is alledged, "it is better to provide an aſylum for them in "our own ſettlements abroad, than to compel "them to ſeek ſhelter in a foreign coun-"try, where they would add to the riches and "ſtrength, perhaps of our enemies."

No doubt but the argument here uſed is juſt, in as far as it concerns men in theſe circumſtances. But becauſe it would be in ſome reſpects beneficial to Britain to retain in her diſtant ſettlements *a few* men of broken fortunes, does it follow that on their account ſhe ſhould attempt to people an immenſe continent at the expence of ſeveral millions of her beſt ſubjects? With the ſame conſiſtency might a phyſician argue, that becauſe

becauſe in certain acute diſorders it is of uſe to take away a little blood, it would be neceſſary to have a principal vein opened, and to allow it to run *ad libitum* without attempting to ſtop it.

It is allowed that on all occaſions it is better if poſſible to prevent a diſeaſe than to cure it. This maxim, ſo univerſally admitted in phyſic, ſeems to be too little attended to in political affairs. Hence laws are multiplied for puniſhing crimes, but little care is taken to remove thoſe circumſtances that give riſe to them. Nothing, it has been ſhewn, has ſuch a tendency to diſcourage a ſpirit of induſtry and frugality among a people, as a great inequality in the circumſtances of individuals of the ſame claſs, when that is obtained by any other means than a ſteady application to buſineſs. It has been alſo ſhewn that the frequent wars and other tranſactions which accompany extended empire, are the moſt effectual means hitherto known for deſtroying that equality of condition which is the nurſe of moderation and induſtry. The ſettling America, therefore, muſt have had a powerful tendency to augment the malady complained of, inſtead of removing it, as the advocates for this ſyſtem have contended. The truth is, in a well-regulated ſtate, the number of the unfortuate members of ſociety above-

mentioned

mentioned will be ſo ſmall, as to require no particular eſtabliſhment to be made on their account. In a ſtate where commerce, in particular, is carried on to a very great extent, there will always be a ſufficient number of outlets for induſtrious perſons in theſe circumſtances, without attempting to ſettle colonies on their account. A legiſlature which guards againſt inſtitutions that have a tendency to involve unwary perſons in diſtreſs, may leave to individuals the charge of taking care of the few who may happen to have been brought into diſtreſs by other cauſes.

VI. "Much as likewiſe been ſaid about the "expence of the poor laws in England. The "number of poor and difficulty of provided "for them here. The eaſe with which they "could ſupport themſelves in America, and the "propriety of allowing them to go thither, "where they would encreaſe and become the "fathers of a numerous poſterity, inſtead of "being an unproductive load on ſociety here."

Without entering deeply into all the diſcuſſions which this inveſtigation would naturally lead to, I ſhall only here obſerve, that however deſirable it might be to have the numerous poor, who are ſuch a heavy load on the induſtry of Britain, removed from thence, and however practible

practible it might be for them to ſupport themſelve elſewhere, yet it is believed there is not a ſingle inſtance to be found of one perſon who ever came upon the pariſh funds in England, having *voluntarily* gone over to America with a view to better his condition. It is the young, the active members of ſociety that tranſport themſelves thither, and not the aged or infirm. It is thoſe who ſhould contribute towards the poors funds rather than thoſe who draw ſuſtenance from thence, who deſert the country. Inſtead therefore of relieving the preſſure of the poor laws, theſe emigrations rather tend to augment them. America therefore has never been of any uſe to England in that way. It may be added, ſhe never can be ſo while the poor laws are ſuffered to remain on their preſent footing. To what country can a poor perſon go where he will be ſo liberally ſupported as in England? It is not ſurely to America.

But if the caſe had been otherwiſe. If it were even true that the poor were ſubjected to ſuch hardſhips here as forced them to ſeek for relief in America, whether would it be wiſer to ſuffer thoſe grievances to continue, without applying a remedy, or to try to diſcover and remove the cauſes of that diſtreſs? No one will heſitate to ſay it would be wiſeſt to attempt the laſt. If then our poor rates are expenſive, inadequate

and

and oppreſſive, why not inveſtigate the cauſes of theſe grievances and remove them? It is not my intention here to enter into this diſcuſſion; but it may be proper to obſerve, that if they are expenſive they are not ſo to the poor, but to thoſe in eaſy circumſtances. If they are oppreſſive they are not ſo to the idle, the ſpend-thrift, and the drunkard, but to the ſober, the induſtrious, and the frugal. They have therefore a neceſſary tendency to attract poor inſtead of driving them away from the country. I add, a tendency to encourage diſſipation and idleneſs at the expence of ſobriety and induſtry. Is it wiſe to tolerate an evil of this nature?

We find in effect, it is not from thoſe parts of the country, where the poor laws prevail, that the moſt copious emigrations take place. It is from thoſe parts where this ſyſtem of laws is not known. It is from thoſe parts of the country where on account of the paucity of inhabitants, induſtry has not yet been fully eſtabliſhed. Is it wiſe then to diſcourage their induſtry by exciting them to emigrations?

It will be ſaid if the inhabitants there have already too little employment, is it not better to baniſh them to our colonies where they will become induſtrious, than to ſuffer them to remain indolent at home? If half the inhabitants are ſufficient for all the labour, why not drive the other half away, that the former may live comfortable on what the latter uſed to conſume?

This was probably the reaſoning of Spain, as it is what her conduct has correſponded to. She did not perceive that by theſe meaſures the little induſtry ſhe had muſt ſtill be growing leſs.

I have had occaſion to ſhew that by driving away the inhabitants you muſt neceſſarily diminiſh the induſtry of the ſtate. Encreaſe them, and you as neceſſarily augment it. The inhabitants of their country, are the conſumers of nineteen twentieths of its produce and manufactures; as it has been already computed— I would ſay rather of forty-nine fiftieths, as the reader will find proved in the margin.* The diminu-

* We muſt not eſtimate the improvement, on the induſtry of a ſtate by the value of its exports. It is only thoſe exports which conſiſt of the produce and manufactures of the country itſelf, which promote the induſtry of its inhabitants. Till theſe therefore are aſcertained, the value of goods exported, can convey no idea of the benefit that the national induſtry derive, from its trade. We export annually of Eaſt India goods to the value of ſeven or eight hundred thouſand pounds. Theſe do not promote the induſtry of the nations. We export annually, to the value of near two millions in coin and bullion, that does not ſurely promote the manufactures of Britain. A nation might carry on trade to an immenſe extent, without exporting a ſingle article either of their own manufactures or produce. The exports from St. Euſtatia in time of war are perhaps equal to a thouſand times the value of the whole produce of the Iſland. From hence I conclude, that no idea can be formed of the augmentation of the induſtry that Britain derives from her commerce, merely by conſidering the value of her exports.

We come ſomewhat nearer the truth by eſtimating it accord-

diminution therefore, of this market muſt produce a very ſenſible change in the total amount of the national induſtry.

This diminution of induſtry is always in a much greater proportion than the diminution of the number of the people, and that for the reaſons aſſigned at large in the ſecond chapter. With the debility occaſioned by theſe migrations the weight of the taxes muſt encreaſe, and the diſcouragements to manufactures be augmented. In proportion therefore as you remove the inhabitants you diminiſh their induſtry and augment their poverty, inſtead of augmenting their induſtry and adding to their riches, as the advocates for this ſyſtem contend.

cording to the balance of the value of exports above the imports; though this alſo, like every thing that depends upon cuſtom houſe books, is liable to great exceptions. The exceſs in this reſpect in favour of Britain, appears to be on an average of ſeveral years paſt, according to Sir Charles Whitworth's tables about two millions and a half per-annum. From this muſt be deducted the value of bullion exported annually, as that, without a doubt muſt have been imported, although no ſuch article appears on the cuſtom-houſe books. This would leave little more than half a million clear in favour of Britain. I am far, however, from thinking that cuſtom houſe books are of ſuch authority as to be relied on implicitly, as a criterion in matters of this kind. But when it is conſidered that the national home conſumption cannot be leſs than ninety millions, and that it *probably* amounts to upwards of a hundred and eighty, millions it will I hope be admitted that the poſition in the text is far from being beyond the truth.

For theſe, and other reaſons, (which for brevity I omit,) it has always been experienced that in every country in which the inhabitants are decreaſing in number, manufactures and induſtry are on the decline; and that on the contrary, wherever the people are encreaſing, their induſtry is found to be encreaſing in a yet more rapid progreſſion than that of their numbers. This is a rule that I believe admits of no exception, and clearly proves the pernicious tendency of that popular ſpirit of monopoly which is at all times ſo jealous of admitting ſtrangers to ſettle in a ſtate, leſt they ſhould, in the proverbial language of the vulgar, *eat the bread out of their mouths:* as if all modern hiſtory was not almoſt a continued illuſtration of the erroneouſneſs of this doctrine. Whoever heard of the deſtructive effects produced to the nation, or the hardſhips impoſed on the inhabitants by the Walloons whom Elizabeth protected? What evils has the republic of Holland experienced from the numbers of people to whom ſhe has offered an aſylum from all countries? Is it not to this cauſe alone ſhe owes her proſperity and opulence? What bad effects do the inhabitants of Leeds, Mancheſter and Liverpool, experience from the great acceſſion of people, from other parts of the country who have been drawn thither within a few years? Have theſe new comers eaten the bread *out of the mouths* of the old inhabitants? no ſuch thing.

All

All parties live more eaſy than formerly, and induſtry is greatly augmented. Let a contrary revolution take place, let the inhabitants *de*creaſe in the ſame proportion, for an equal number of years, what would be the change? Their manufactures would be totally loſt. Their few inhabitants would be reduced to a ſtate of abject indolence. Proviſions would not be produced ſufficient to feed them, although for the preſent numerous body of people there is an abundance and to ſpare; and poverty and want would be univerſally experienced inſtead of the wealth with which thoſe places abound at preſent.

The only other argument that occurs to me in favour of colonies is,

VII. "That when a country becomes too "full of inhabitants ſo that they are ſtraitened "for room, and do not find means of ſubſiſtence, "it becomes neceſſary to drive away a part of "the people, that the remainder may be enabled "to live."

This laſt ſeems to have been almoſt the ſole reaſon for eſtabliſhing colonies in *antient times*: but it is ſeldom mentioned *directly* by modern authors, though often hinted at in an indirect and oblique manner. There is good reaſon for this difference. In antient times, when induſtry, according to our idea of it was not known, the evil complained of was often *really* experienced. In modern times ſuch a thing is hardly poſſible.

Induſtry

Induſtry and commerce can ſupply every defect, even where the very ſurface of the earth is wanting. Holland experiences an univerſal plenty, although its ſoil in its moſt improved ſtate cannot, according to De Witt, ſupport one third of its inhabitants, and in its original ſtate could not perhaps have maintained one thouſandth part of them *. In a commercial ſtate wherever induſtry prevails proviſions will be found in abundance, however unfavourable the ſituation may be; of which Leeds and Wakefield in Yorkſhire are noted examples: wherever indolence prevails, however rich the ſoil and few the inhabitants, ſcarcity will be often experienced. When Spain poſſeſſed above twenty five millions of people, they had all abundance of food and to ſpare. It was of old the granary, in ſome meaſure, of Carthage and of Rome; now, that its people exceed not eight millions they are often obliged to depend upon others for ſubſiſtence.

But if induſtry may procure ſubſiſtence to numerous inhabitants where the ſoil itſelf is altogether wanting, it will be far more eaſy to be effected where that is to be found in abundance. On a barren ſoil it is ſcarcely poſſible to form an idea of the improvement in point of fertility that

* De Witt ſays, if all the land of Holland were ſown with wheat, and if it yielded on an average ten ſacks per morgen, (a morgen is about two acres) the whole produce would not be ſufficient to afford the inhabitants one pound of bread per day each. Intereſt of Holland.

that may take place by human induſtry, nor will that be wanting wherever numbers of men are now collected together. I myſelf know fields which twenty years ago were ſo ſterile, that the produce of a hundred acres would ſcarce have furniſhed ſubſiſtence to one man, any acre of which at preſent would be enough to furniſh him with full ſubſiſtence throughout the year.

Here we cannot help remarking what an amazing difference there is between man and other animals. With regard to the laſt nature has ſet bounds to their increaſe by limiting their food. The amount of this they never can encreaſe, ſo that if their numbers riſe beyond what that is able to maintain they muſt be ſtarved. Not ſo with man in a civilized ſtate. By his exertions he can encreaſe the quantity of his food to an inconceivable amount. Hence it may eaſily happen that a country which at one time produces a ſcanty proportion of proviſions for a few inhabitants, may produce at another time more than ſufficient for fifty times their number. Indeed this not only *may* but *muſt* be the caſe if ſurface of ſoil abounds, and induſtry encreaſes. The reverſe muſt as neceſſarily happen if population and induſtry decreaſe; as the example of Spain, the pope's territories in Italy, and many others abundantly prove. Deterioration is ſtill an eaſier proceſs than amelioration.

Hence it follows that no commercial country can be too fully peopled where induſtry abounds.

But

But with regard to Britain in particular, whoſe territory could maintain, if fully improved, not leſs than an hundred times its preſent inhabitants, there was no neceſſity to ſearch for colonies on this account.

Thus have I at length arrived at the end of this important diſquiſition. The reſult of the whole is. *That our American colonies inſtead of promoting the trade and manufactures of Great Britain, have tended in a moſt powerful manner to depreſs them. That inſtead of adding ſtrength and ſtability to the empire, they have neceſſarily weakened it in a great degree, and expoſed it to the moſt imminent danger. That, therefore, the ſettling of theſe colonies at firſt was unwiſe, and the ſubſequent encouragement that was given them highly impolitic.*

Here then my taſk ſhould end. But I ſhould leave the ſubject imperfect, did I not further enquire what are the moſt proper ſteps to be purſued by Britain to ward off the dangers which may be expected to ſpring from that ſource in future; or what is the moſt likely conduct now to be purſued to make theſe colonies contribute in the moſt effectual manner to promote the intereſt of the Mother Country. Such are the objects diſcuſſed in the following appendix.

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APPENDIX.

AFTER conſidering what has been ſaid in the preceding part of this Eſſay, the following queſtion would naturally occur to every attentive enquirer.—"Although it ſhould be admitted that it "was at firſt unwiſe in Britain to begin to "plant colonies in America, and impo-"litic in her afterwards to encourage her "ſubjects to migrate thither; yet, as theſe "things have been already done, and can-"not now be undone, and as in conſe-"quence thereof the colonies have become "conſiderable, and their trade has grown "to be an object of great magnitude, "would it now be wiſe and politic in "Britain to renounce all claim to that "commerce? Would it not be more ju-"dicious in her rather to cultivate that "trade with the utmoſt care, as the moſt "effectual means in her power to reap any "advantage from the colonies, and repair "the errors ſhe has already committed?

The anſwer to this query is obvious. It is the intereſt of Britain to promote her own manufactures and commerce to the utmoſt of her power; therefore it ſhould be her ſtudy, by every judicious method ſhe can deviſe, to ſecure to herſelf as much of the American trade as poſſible.

" Is it, on the other hand, the intereſt " of Britain to continue to defend and " protect her American colonies; to fight " their battles as heretofore, at her own " expence, without drawing from thence " ſufficient funds to indemnify her for the " additional charge thus incurred, both " in her civil and military eſtabliſhment?" Surely not. Inevitable ruin, ſhould ſuch a ſyſtem be perſiſted in, muſt be the conſequence.

What is to be done in ſuch a dilemma? America refuſes to be taxed, or to ſubmit to ſuch regulations as are neceſſary to ſecure her trade to Britain. It would be happy if any device could be invented, by which the parent country could be ſecured in the poſſeſſion of every thing eſſentially valuable

valuable in their commerce, and be relieved from the expence of protecting them, while at the ſame time the Americans were left at liberty to aſſeſs on themſelves whatever taxes they ſhould incline, without the intervention of any foreign power whatever. Nor does it ſeem impoſſible to accompliſh this, could the prejudices of all parties be for a ſhort time removed.

There are particular regulations of government, which, without being in themſelves more grievous than others, by holding up to view at all times an appearance of inferiority and ſubjection, are exceedingly humiliating and grievous to be borne. "Were reaſons as thick as hops, ſays Falſtaff, I would not give them *upon compulſion.*" This is the language of human nature in all ages and countries; and this is the reaſon why every inferior ſociety looks up with a malevolent jealouſy to the ſuperior power which governs it, and is at all times diſpoſed to think itſelf oppreſſed by every exertion of power, however mild it may in effect be. In this manner the Americans have always beheld with a pe-

culiar jealouſy and uneaſineſs thoſe political regulations that Britain has adopted with regard to them. Nor ſhould we—or any other body of men accuſtomed to the ideas of freedom, have been affected in any other manner. It was natural; the relation they bore to us, neceſſarily ſuggeſted it.—Why, then, ſhould we be diſpoſed to blame, with harſh epithets, men who have acted in a manner ſo natural, and in a manner not at all incompatible with the beſt diſpoſitions of mind?

But if the people of America do not deſerve to be harſhly blamed for errors naturally ariſing from the peculiarity of their ſituation, far leſs do the Rulers in Britain deſerve the ſevere epithets that have been beſtowed upon them. I mean no apology for preſent men or meaſures. But, aſſuredly, protection received by any body of people requires an equivalent. Unfortunately, the Americans were not, nor ever could be, in a condition to pay a proper equivalent to Britain for the loſs ſhe ſuſtained on their account. Their ſituation forbids it; and it is this untoward circumſtance that has ever embarraſſed Miniſters

in

in reſpect to American affairs, and made it equally impoſſible, on the one hand, to promote, as they were bound to do, the intereſts of the parent ſtate, and, on the other, to ſatisfy the ruling prejudices of the people.

The monopoly of the American trade has been at all times the favourite object of the Engliſh nation, and has, from the firſt ſettlement of theſe provinces, been an unceaſing cauſe of diſcontent to the coloniſts. They felt it from the beginning, as a grievous mark of ſubjection, and it has continually rankled in their boſom. It was to them *the worm that never dieth.* It has been the ſecret cauſe of almoſt all the jarrings that have happened between them and us. Early did they make efforts to evade it; but it was at all times found to be ſuch a ſacred object in the eyes of the whole Engliſh nation, that not a whiſper durſt be uttered againſt it, for fear of giving an inſtant and univerſal alarm, which would have united all ranks of people in Britain as one man. Other cauſes of grievance, that would be more favourably received in Britain, were ſought for; and, in the

the mean time, every mode that ingenuity could deviſe, was adopted to elude ſuch laws as were made to ſecure the monopoly.

Governors in America, and Miniſters in Britain, long winked at almoſt an open and avowed contravention of theſe laws. This did not ſerve to conciliate the good-will of the Americans; it only laid the foundation of new diſtreſſes. In conſequence of repeated notices from the ſervants of the Crown, peremptory inſtructions were ſent to the Governors to check thoſe flagrant tranſgreſſions of a law deemed the bulwark of the commerce of Britain. The conſequence was, that the Americans were ſeized with the moſt inveterate antipathy to every perſon who favoured theſe ſchemes. Every contrivance which cunning could invent, was adopted to thwart the public exertions of any one who was concerned in theſe deteſted regulations. Thoſe of the Americans, whoſe trade had ſuffered by the interruption of the contraband commerce, laid hold of every popular ſubject of declamation to inflame the minds of the people; which was the immediate cauſe of the diſturbances that now prevail.

I have

I have been thus particular in tracing the cauſe of the preſent calamities, becauſe it affords a leſſon of the higheſt importance in colonial Government. I have already ſhewn, at great length, that Britain, inſtead of being benefited by this reſtraint on the American trade, was really hurt, conſiderably hurt by it, in as far as it took effect. She therefore impoſed a load on the Americans, which they felt as a grievous oppreſſion, without doing herſelf the ſmalleſt ſervice. They felt it with indignation, like the Princes who were of old compelled to drag the chariots of their conquerors; not ſo much becauſe of the preſſure of the burthen, as becauſe of the ſubjection it implied. Yet, hurtful as it was, or unimportant at the beſt, it is probable the Britiſh nation would, at any time, have willingly undertaken a ten years war rather than have voluntarily relinquiſhed it.

Where prejudices of this kind prevail, it is almoſt vain to enter into argument; yet it is ſcarcely poſſible to avoid making ſome reflexions on a caſe of this nature. Were the meaſure fraught even with many beneficial conſequences, theſe would be purchaſed

chaſed very dear by the general diſcontent of ſo large a part of the King's ſubjects. Were it accompanied with many advantages to the community, the difficulty of enforcing it is ſo great, as to deter a man of moderate principles from attempting it. To inſure a monopoly of this kind, many precautions muſt be taken, which are accompanied with a great expence to the State, and waſte of people, and which, after all, never can prove effectual. Theſe efforts, indeed, uſually ſerve no other end than to enrich one ſet of men at the expence of another; to multiply crimes, and to augment without neceſſity the number and ſeverity of puniſhments; to render the inſtruments of Government inſolent and oppreſſive, and to alienate the affections of the governed *. If then it would be imprudent to force even a *beneficial* meaſure at the riſque of all theſe inconveniencies, how much more imprudent muſt it be to attempt

* Some idea may be formed of the difficulties and expence of attempting to prevent a contraband trade, from the following curious ſtate of facts relating to the attempts made to export wool from England.

" A List

" A List of the number of Surveyors and Riding Officers deputed by the Commissioners appointed by Act of Parliament, made in the first year of the reign of King William and Queen Mary, for preventing the Exportation of Wool, &c. with the Counties they were posted in; what seizures of Wool were made by them, and the value thereof; with the difficulties they underwent in that service, as well as charge in obtaining and entering informations; as also carrying on prosecutions against the Exporters of Wool in the Court of Exchequer.

Surveyors.	Counties under their charge.	Numbers of riding horses.	Packs of wool seized.	What appraised at	Number of packs condemned.	Recovery there of.	Sacks rescued from the officers.	Value of the wool rescued from the officers.	Officers expences annually in keeping themselves and horses, at 60l. per annum.
				£.		£.		£.	£.
Captain Wm. Ingram, sen.	Northumber. Durham Cumberland	54	105	530	57	140	236	1262	3240
W. Ingram, jun.	Yorkshire	18	46	236	6	35	53	275	1080
Robert Moore	Lincolnshire	19	38	214	0	0	41	246	1140
Robert Carter	Lancashire	10	6	56	0	0	0	0	600
Thomas Braine	Cheshire	7	3	16	0	0	12	72	420
John Stokes	Norfolk	16	6	35	5	30	36	198	960
Edward Norden	Suffolk	9	4	22	4	23	0	0	540
John Hamilton	Essex	9	29	146	20	105	5	30	540
Ed. Anderson	Surrey	4	6	33	6	32	8	44	240
Robert Barker	Kent	36	65	362	8	44	45	270	2160
Charles Webb	Sussex	20	26	148	12	72	21	126	1200
Sam. Spicer	Hampshire	28	55	306	12	72	6	36	1680
W. Whotton	Dorsetshire	16	11	62	6	34	0	0	960
Chr. Pollard	Devonshire	12	9	52	5	36	25	140	720
Wm. Sims	Cornwall	14	12	68	6	33	4	24	840
J. Larton	Somerset and Bristol	12	9	52	5	36	25	150	720
J. Hughes	London and Middlesex	15	22	126	8	46	12	72	900
17	19	299	457	3791	162	744	594	2705	17,940

attempt them in favour of a meaſure, that if accompliſhed muſt prove hurtful. Would it

The charges of the Commiſſioners for Wool, were annually as follow :

	£.
To poſtage of letters from their officers ——— ———	43 0 0
To their ſecretary, clerks, meſſengers, and door-keepers — —	180 0 0
To the coſt of a ſloop, and fitting out to ſea for cruiſing on the coaſt of Kent and Suſſex, with the charge of victualling, wages, tear and wear —	676 0 0
To ſeventeen ſuperviſors, or chief agents, at 120l. per annum each —	2040 0 0
To two hundred ninety-nine riding officers, at 60l. per annum ——	17940 0 0
Total	20879 0 0

" N. B. The officers met with great diſcouragement from Juſtices of the Peace in ſeveral counties, eſpecially Northumberland, and the biſhoprick of Durham, by being impriſoned, and having legal ſeizures taken from them, viz. Sir *Francis Blake, then Member of Parliament*, Juſtice *Howard, Forſter, Taylor, Gray, Collingwood.*"

" *Note*, That of 3791 packs of Wool ſeized, there were but 162 condemned in the Exchequer ; the remainder was either reſcued, or not proſecuted, for

it not, therefore, be wiſe in Britain to remove that uſeleſs bar to the happineſs of her

for want of money. The recoveries on thoſe condemned, amounted to 744l. two-thirds of which was ſpent in proſecutions, and the moiety given by law to the Crown, ſo that the officers had no more than 248l. The ſloop took 80 packs of Wool, which was appraiſed at 402l. moſt of which, after being condemned at the Captain's charge in the Court of Exchequer, lies now in the Cuſtom-houſe warehouſes, being refuſed to be delivered until the moiety due to the Crown was paid, which Edwards, the maſter of the ſloop, was rendered unable to do, having expended his ſubſtance in carrying on proſecutions againſt the offenders, &c *."

This exhibits a ſtrong picture of the difficulty of reſtraining a trade, when it is directly contrary to the intereſts of the dealers that it ſhould be ſo. From the ſame authority †, we learn, that, beſides the above, the nation had been at the charge of 55,000l. annually for frigates and ſloops; notwithſtanding which, the exporting of Wool continued to be practiſed to a great extent, and almoſt openly. If ſuch difficulties then occur in Britain, immediately

* Smith's Memoirs of Wool, vol. 2. p. 166, 7, 8.

† Ibid. p. 170.

her colonies? Is it not ſound policy to conciliate their affection, rather than provoke their hate?

In reſolving to adopt a meaſure of this kind, what would Britain loſe? She would loſe a feather, and, in exchange, obtain a real treaſure. The export trade from this country would continue as extenſive as formerly, with this material difference, that in the one caſe the purchaſers would be always ſatisfied of the reaſonableneſs of their bargains, which, in the other caſe, they never could be convinced of. The export of manufactures from this country, it is highly probable, would even increaſe; becauſe our manufacturers would become more careful, and our merchants leſs avaricious and leſs inſolent. Our goods would of courſe be ſomewhat better, and could be afforded a little cheaper than formerly. They would, therefore, be voluntarily preferred to

ately under the eye of the Legiſlature, what may be expected in America? If our own Members of Parliament and Juſtices of Peace ſhow ſuch an open contempt of the laws in this caſe, can we be ſurpriſed at the Magiſtrates in America purſuing a ſimilar conduct?

to thoſe of other nations, through choice, if they are of equal value; and it is acknowledged, that it is in vain to think of *forcing* a trade, *in any circumſtances*, by compulſory laws, where the goods of foreign nations can be afforded cheaper and better than our own. Britain never yet could ſell goods to any conſiderable amount in America, which ſhe could not have ſold there if the trade had been entirely open. The ſame obſervation will apply to the colonies, in America, of every other European ſtate.

If, then, we derive no advantage from our monopoly of the American trade, in reſpect to our own produce and manufactures, which we ſhould not equally enjoy were it entirely laid open, why ſhould we heſitate about giving up that diſtreſſing monopoly? And if we ſhould reſolve to adopt that ſalutary meaſure, what reaſon can we have to burthen ourſelves any longer with the defence of thoſe extenſive regions? We cannot now be ignorant of the difficulty, if not the impoſſibility of ever drawing from thence a revenue in any degree proportioned to the expence of that protection. Why, then, ſhould we take upon

upon ourſelves the troubleſome and ungracious taſk of ſqueezing from them a ſcanty pittance, that never could be adequate to the purpoſes required? The Americans themſelves have offered to free us of that taſk. No ſatisfactory reaſon has yet been given, why we ſhould not accept their offer.

I am aware that gentlemen in Britain will be at firſt ſtartled at a propoſal of the nature here made; but I beg they will take the trouble to reflect upon it coolly, before they come to a final determination. Our ſelf-love, and the prejudices it engenders, often make us view tranſactions relating to ourſelves in a very different light from that in which we behold ſimilar tranſactions relating to others. There is not a man in Britain, who does not at once perceive that all the trading nations of Europe participate of the Spaniſh American trade, not only by an indirect, circuitous commerce, but even directly, in ſpite of the numerous *garda coſtas*, with which the ſhores of her American colonies are continually ſurrounded. Are our American ſhores more eaſily guarded? It is well known

known that Holland, which poſſeſſes only a few lodgements in the Weſt Indies, carries on a trade thither nearly as conſiderable, in the export of European commodities, as any of thoſe powers which poſſeſs extenſive colonies. What becomes of all theſe goods? They are ſold by a contraband trade in the colonies of France, of Spain, of Portugal, and of BRITAIN.

If, then, (I am obliged to repeat it) no reſtrictive laws can inſure to us the monopoly of our colonial trade—and if the attempt to inforce ſuch a monopoly be attended with great expence, and other very bad conſequences to ourſelves, where would be the harm of renouncing it?

Againſt this laſt propoſal there lies *one* very material objection. America offers to undertake a taſk, the difficulty of which ſhe is not as yet acquainted with. A child who is ignorant of danger, often expreſſes the greateſt deſire to handle edged tools, or to walk upon a precipice, and, if warned of the danger, will, without fear, make many proteſtations of caution, and aſſeverations that no miſchief will happen from granting

granting its requeſt. But, is the danger the leſs, becauſe the child ſees it not? In ſuch circumſtances, it is prudent in the parent to deny the requeſt, with whatever earneſtneſs it may be urged. So it is in the caſe of America. We muſt not forget their near relation to us, nor caſt them entirely off becauſe they have indicated a little waywardneſs of diſpoſition. Were they to be declared entirely independent, and left to ſtruggle with the wide world, as well as to ſettle thoſe internal diſputes that would, in that caſe, infallibly ariſe, they would quickly be obliged to apply to ſome foreign power for aſſiſtance. This would lay a foundation either for their intire ſubjection to that power, or for a burdenſome dependance, which would produce party diſputes among themſelves, and, at laſt, the interference of ſome other foreign power. Strife and wars would thus be perpetuated; the colonies, themſelves, would be harraſſed beyond meaſure; and, whatever other parties were engaged, Britain, becauſe of the vicinity of her ſettlements, could not remain neutral. Thus ſhould we loſe at once our colonies and their trade, and be involved in ſtill greater trouble and expence,

pence, on their account, than if they had continued to demand our ſole protection.

To avoid all theſe evils, and obtain the bleſſings required, nothing more ſeems neceſſary than to lay open the trade to America to all the maritime ſtates in Europe. In return for this favour, the whole maritime powers in Europe ſhould become guarantees of the articles of convention, in as far as they regarded America. Great would be the advantages that the neutral powers would gain by ſuch a plan of pacification, which would be wholly loſt ſhould the peace be diſturbed by any one. Where, therefore, it is ſo ſtrongly the intereſt of the whole conjunctly and ſeverally to oppoſe any innovation, there is the greateſt reaſon to think that it would be long preſerved inviolate.

Upon theſe principles, I humbly offer to the public the following ſketch of the outlines of a general pacification, which, in as far as I am able to judge, at the ſame time that it would be the moſt ſtrictly juſt and equitable, would more effectually tend to promote the intereſts of every party

concerned, and fix the general tranquillity of Europe on a firmer baſis than could be effected by any other plan that has hitherto been made public.

Article I. All former treaties, contracts, immunities, and dependencies, between different ſtates, in every thing relative to America, including the Weſt-India iſlands, ſhall be wholly aboliſhed.

Article II. The trade to every part of America, including the Weſt-India iſlands as above, ſhall be open, and equally free, to all the powers who enter into this confederacy, either as principals, or guarantees: but all others ſhall be wholly excluded from thence.

Article III. All goods imported into any part of America after weeks from the day of the ſigning of this treaty, by the ſubjects of any of the confederated powers above mentioned, ſhall be admitted duty free, and no bounties upon importation ſhall be allowed; excepting always conſumable proviſions of all kinds, with regard to which, the ruling powers of each diſtrict

diſtrict ſhall be at liberty either to impoſe duties, or to grant bounties on importation, as they ſhall judge moſt conducive to the well-being of the inhabitants.

Article IV. With reſpect to goods *exported* from any of the above-mentioned countries, the ruling powers in each diſtrict may impoſe ſuch duties as they ſhall judge moſt expedient; but, whatever theſe duties are, they ſhall be exactly the ſame, to the ſubjects of each of the confederated powers, as if they had been exported by the ſubjects of the ſtate itſelf from which they are ſent*.

Article V. As to the commerce by land, between neighbouring ſtates on the continent of America, all *imports* ſhall be free, excepting only proviſions, as above excepted, for foreign imports: and, on *exports*, no higher duty ſhall in any caſe be impoſed, than the ſame article bears if exported

* Logwood, which is at preſent duty-free to the ſubjects of Great Britain, to be excluded; and no duties to be demanded upon it, at leaſt from the ſubjects of Britain.

ported by ſea; but that duty may be moderated, when exported by land, if it ſhall be judged expedient.

Article VI. With regard to the territorial juriſdiction in America, the following regulations ſhall take place. That is to ſay,

To Great Britain ſhall belong, Florida, eaſt and weſt, Georgia, Carolina, the town of New York, with Long and Staten iſlands, and the county of New York, properly ſo called (if it ſhall be thought worth while to keep theſe;) Nova Scotia, with its dependencies; Canada, with its dependencies; Terra de Labrador, and Hudſon's Bay, Newfoundland, and all the iſlands in the Weſt-Indies that Britain poſſeſſed at the beginning of the preſent war,—unleſs it ſhould be otherwiſe ſtipulated.

To Spain, France, Portugal, Holland, and Denmark, the ſeveral territories and iſlands they reſpectively poſſeſſed at the beginning of the preſent war. And,

To the States of America, under the regula-

regulations contained in this treaty, the provinces of Virginia, Maryland, Pennſylvania, the Jerſeys, that part of New York not reſerved by Britain, and New England, with all its dependencies. The boundaries of all theſe regions, where they border upon other ſtates, to be aſcertained with the utmoſt exactneſs, before the ſigning of the definitive treaty.

Article VII. All perſons who have been deprived of their property in America, or who have otherwiſe ſuffered on account of their adherence to the antient form of government under Great Britain, ſhall have their eſtates reſtored to them; and the other damages they have ſuſtained on this account, fully made up to them by the ſtates of the ſeveral provinces where thoſe damages were ſuſtained. The extent of theſe damages to be aſcertained on the ſpot, before Commiſſioners to be appointed expreſsly for that purpoſe. And they ſhall have liberty either to remain in the provinces, without any diſturbance on this account in future, or to ſell their effects, and retire whitherſoever they ſhall incline.

Article

Article VIII. None of the confederated powers above named, ſhall in any way interfere in any internal diſputes that ſhall ariſe in any of the American ſettlements that are not under their own immediate dominion.

Article IX. And if any one of the parties concerned in this confederacy, ſhall attack any of the dominions in America, that by this treaty are declared to belong to another, or ſhall otherwiſe infringe any of the articles of this treaty, the offending party ſhall, *ipſo facto*, be put under the ban of the confederacy, and ſhall be proceeded againſt, by all its members, as a common enemy.

Article X. If, while any power ſhall be thus under the ban of the confederacy, any of its members ſhall be backward in treating the aggreſſor as an enemy, and ſhall neglect to do ſo, after being duly required, ſuch neglecting power ſhall be excluded from the confederacy, and debarred from having any commerce with America ever after. Its ſhips may be ſeized by any of the confederates, and legally condemned as prizes, if they be found in any of the

American

American ſeas, or any where elſe, if bound either to or from thoſe parts.

Article XI. When any of the confederated powers ſhall be at war in Europe, all kinds of wood, fit for ſhip-building, hemp, ropes, ſaltpetre, gunpowder, inſtruments of war, and all kinds of naval and military ſtores, ſhall be declared contraband commodities, with reſpect to the belligerent powers; and, as ſuch, may be legally ſeized and confiſcated, when going to an enemy. The ſhip only, if neutral property, to be reſtored to the owners.

Article XII. Diſputes ariſing between any of the confederates in Europe, ſhall in no wiſe extend to their ſettlements, if they have any, in America, which ſhall at all times remain in a ſtate of the ſtricteſt neutrality, under the guarantee of this confederacy. Hoſtilities, in theſe caſes, to ceaſe every where to the weſtward of the Azores.

Article XIII. The Emperor, the Empreſs of Ruſſia, and all the maritime powers in Europe, ſhall be invited to accede to this treaty, to become members of the

the confederacy, and guarantees of the preſent treaty, in as far as it relates to America only.

I do not enter into any other diſcuſſion relative to the peace, but in as far as regards America alone. There would probably be very little difficulty in adjuſting all other differences.

A treaty, on the principles above mentioned, would, I am afraid, have too much of an Utopian appearance, to obtain a candid examination. If ſo, the world is come to a bad paſs indeed, when nothing more is neceſſary to make a propoſal be rejected without examination, than that it has the appearance of proving very extenſively uſeful to mankind.

But, however chimerical ſuch a plan may appear in modern times, it is well known that a league founded upon the ſame principles, operated the moſt beneficial conſequences in Europe, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This was the Hanſeatic confederacy ſo renowned in the hiſtory of arts and commerce.

To think that man will ever be induced to purſue ſteadily any other object than what ſeems to promote his own intereſt, is, in my opinion, highly chimerical: and the ſame obſervation may be applied to ſtates. They may, indeed, often misjudge what is for their own intereſt, and therefore purſue improper meaſures. The aim of ſound policy ſhould be, to correct theſe aberrations as much as poſſible. But if no principle of action is ſteady but ſelf-intereſt, it will follow, that theſe aberrations can never be ſteadily and uniformly repreſſed, unleſs by contriving that the ſelf-intereſt of *many* ſhall be hurt by the errors of any *one*. This is the principle upon which the whole of the foregoing plan depends. If that principle is erroneous, the plan muſt indeed be chimerical. If it be juſt, there is no impoſſibility but the plan may prove ſtable. It therefore deſerves to be examined.

It is evidently the intereſt of all the neutral maritime powers in Europe to enter into this confederacy, ſhould it ever be propoſed to them; and it is equally their intereſt to maintain the articles of the con-

federacy inviolate, after it ſhould be entered into. Singly, it would be long before they could force themſelves into the great circle of commerce, when they were ſo often liable to interfere with certain rights that the great maritime powers think they have a title to enjoy. When thus called out in a body, they would become of importance—that importance would be loſt, if ever they ſhould diſunite. It is fortunate here, too, that they are called to unite only in a caſe where all their intereſts muſt concur towards one point. Where their intereſts might interfere, they are ſtill allowed to be as much disjoined as ever. To thoſe powers, therefore, which are here invited to become guarantees only, there is little doubt but this propoſal would be abundantly acceptable.

The proprietary ſtates would, on the other hand, be ſtill greater gainers. The profits made by the neutral maritime powers, if conſidered as a premium of inſurance againſt loſſes by war, and money neceſſarily to be advanced for the ſecurity and defence of theſe colonies, would be found to bear ſuch a ſmall proportion to what has been

been at all times neceſſarily expended for theſe purpoſes, that the gains to the nation by this bargain muſt appear immenſe. With regard to Britain in particular, it is well known, that within the ſpace of forty years ſhe has been involved in three moſt bloody and expenſive wars, purely on account of her colonies. Theſe three wars (alone, without reckoning the ſtated annual expence on account of the colonies, which cannot be computed at leſs than one million a year) have not coſt the nation leſs than two hundred millions of money. An amazing ſum! It muſt, indeed, be a gainful commerce that is worth purchaſing at ſuch a rate.

By the preſent propoſal we ſhould be inſured againſt all ſimilar loſſes in future for next to nothing—(Perhaps, if I had ſaid leſs than nothing, I ſhould have been right.) It has been already proved, that it is not in the power of any one to prevent others from ſharing in the trade of thoſe countries, by any other means than by affording the articles wanted, cheaper than they can be obtained from others; and it has been likewiſe ſhewn, that a monopoly of trade tends

to raiſe the price of goods coming from the monopolizing ſtate, and of thus favouring the commerce of its rivals, without obtaining ſo much as their good-will, far leſs any favours in return. By *voluntarily* granting them a participation in our trade, we grant them a favour*, in return for which we receive another of the moſt eſſential importance, and that without diminiſhing our own trade in the ſmalleſt degree. On the contrary, if we reflect on what might have been the conſequence to the manufactures and induſtry of the nation; if the ſums of money above mentioned, inſtead of having been expended on the deſtructive operations of war, had been employed for the encouragement of domeſtic induſtry; and if the numerous people whoſe lives have been ſacrificed in theſe wars, had been allowed to augment our inhabitants; we ſhall be convinced that our manufactures and commerce would now have

* It deſerves to be obſerved, that, with regard to the neutral ſtates propoſed, which could not for many centuries, if ever, have participated in the American trade, the favour is not leſs *real* than apparent.

have been in a much more flouriſhing ſtate than at preſent. It follows, that if theſe drains, for the future, ſhall ceaſe, in conſequence of the propoſed arrangement, ſimilar beneficial effects will be experienced. As the ſame obſervations are equally applicable to all the proprietary kingdoms, it is unneceſſary to repeat them.

Here, then, we diſcover a noble plan of national œconomy, a means of retrenching expenditure to an amazing extent, not only without diminiſhing the riches of any one ſtate, but even by adding to the income of each. It is thus that trade and induſtry, when properly directed, augment the riches of all the parties concerned. A ſeeming paradox, which, though often explained, ſeems not to be in general ſufficiently underſtood; otherwiſe we ſhould not ſo often meet with gloomy politicians, who with ſuch care compute the gains of others, and from the amount infer the extent of our own loſs. It is impoſſible to prevent a little mind from being envious of the proſperity of another. Grovelling itſelf, it can never form an idea of riſing to ſuperior excellence, but wiſhes to ſink others below

below its own level. It is equally impoſſible to prevent one of a dignified mind from feeling that he may attain to high and ſtill higher degrees of excellence, and that nothing will contribute ſo much to forward theſe attainments as the advancing of others who in the ſame line endeavour to keep pace with him. He therefore glories in their progreſs. Their advancement forms a ſcale by which he meaſures his own. Like an intrepid officer at the head of a determined band, they mutually advance with confidence, to glory; well knowing that the endeavours of the whole contribute to the ſafety of each. The advances of the laſt keep pace with the progreſs of the firſt, and each preſerves his ſtation undiſturbed.

In the ſame manner do ſtates, vying with each other in exertions of induſtry and trade, when properly directed, mutually forward the attainments of each other. They advance together; but that one among them which is once foremoſt will continue foremoſt ſtill, if equal exertions are made. If induſtry ſlackens in one place, the progreſs may be retarded; but if others

advance,

advance, that ſtate will infallibly be left behind, whatever efforts it may make to retard the progreſs of thoſe within its reach.

Of all the parties concerned in this treaty, perhaps the Britiſh Americans would find their ſituation the leaſt benefited by it: The debts they have contracted during the preſent conteſt, would occaſion taxes of a very different kind from any they have hitherto experienced; and the expence of government would be much augmented. But they themſelves will allow, that no other method they could propoſe would be nearly ſo efficacious for abridging that expence, and ſecuring their liberties. They would, no doubt, ſtrongly oppoſe the ſeventh of the above articles; but it would be an eternal diſgrace upon Britain, ſhould ſhe ever recede from it. This ought therefore to be inſiſted on as a preliminary by Britain, without which no other condition ſhould be liſtened to.

While I now write, the news of the ſurrender of Lord Cornwallis has juſt been brought me. Like every good ſubject, I regret

regret the misfortune of ſo many brave men; but the misfortune would be much more than counterbalanced, could the nation by this means be brought to reflect ſeriouſly on the nature of that object for which they are contending. I would not, from hence, wiſh to be underſtood, as if I meant to inſinuate, that, were the object worth the charge of the conteſt, Britain has it not ſtill in her power to compel the Coloniſts to accept of whatever terms ſhe may think fit to dictate. But I wiſh not to ſee the Coloniſts reduced to that ſtate of ſubjection. It is not the intereſt of Britain that they ſhould be ſo. Happy would it be for all parties, if they could allow their animoſities to ſubſide, and be guided by thoſe principles only which tend to promote their own intereſt and true glory. Then would they all, inſtead of waſting their beſt blood and treaſure in purſuit of the phantom *conqueſt*, which ſeems ever near, but continually eludes the graſp, put up their ſwords in peace, and emulouſly ſtrive which ſhall excel in healing moſt quickly thoſe deep wounds that each has received from the blind folly and ungovernable phrenzy of the other.

Should

Should Britain, thus freed from the uninterrupted attention ſhe has been obliged to beſtow on external objects, be at liberty to examine her own internal condition, ſhe would be aſtoniſhed to find what unobſerved treaſures ſhe poſſeſſes within herſelf; treaſures which her own induſtry may effectually ſecure, in ſpite of all the efforts of mankind to wreſt them from her; treaſures which, if they had not belonged to herſelf, ſhe would have coveted, and have made inconceivable exertions to obtain, had they been to be found at the extremities of the earth; but which, ſeemingly for no other reaſon but becauſe they are at our door, and completely under our command, we have entirely diſregarded. The treaſures I ſpeak of, are the fiſheries on our coaſts; the value of which has never yet been attempted to be aſcertained*. I ſay, they have not been attempted to be aſcertained; becauſe a few obſervations, that have

* See on this ſubject Sir Walter Raleigh, and Monſon's tracts; alſo Obſervations on the Means of exciting a Spirit of National Induſtry; alſo Locke's Eſſays on the Trade, Manufactures, and Fiſheries of Scotland.

have been made by individuals, without public authority, can never be conſidered in this light.

Should ſhe examine the ſtate of her diſtant provinces, ſhe would find ſhe poſſeſſes multitudes of people who are capable of the higheſt exertions when called into action*, but who, for want of proper attention, are ſuffered to languiſh in indolence. She would perceive that ſhe poſſeſſes territories fit to maintain an immenſe population, which at preſent lie waſte for want of mouths to conſume their produce. She would ſee that ſhe poſſeſſes extenſive diſtricts, that enjoy almoſt unrivalled advantages for carrying on manufactures and commerce, which are now deſerted becauſe no attention has been beſtowed to employ them for thoſe purpoſes. In ſhort, it would then be made apparent, that Britain in herſelf could find ſubſiſtence for at leaſt a hundred times the preſent number of her people; that theſe numerous inhabitants could be in a great meaſure ſupplied with materials in the iſland to keep them employed;

* This alludes to the Highlanders of Scotland.

ployed; that no other rival ſtate could poſſeſs nearly the ſame advantages, either in reſpect to manufactures or commerce; and that at a thouſandth part of the expence which has been beſtowed on America, theſe manufactures might be ſo firmly eſtabliſhed, as to bid defiance to the combined efforts of the univerſe to diſturb them. Trade would neceſſarily keep pace with them; not that kind of feeble diſtempered trade which is obliged to depend on monopolies for its exiſtence, but that which by its native vigour will force its way into the remoteſt corners of the globe, by making it the intereſt of all people to participate of the advantages it will bring them.

Let us, therefore, ſecure America from the fear of diſturbances, and turn our attention to our own domeſtic proſperity—Let us ſtop emigrations, by furniſhing our people at home with the means of benefiting themſelves by their own induſtry—Let us encourage others to come and ſettle among us, by allowing them to participate of the advantages we enjoy. They will add to our riches and our ſtrength. Let us conciliate the good-will of the neighbouring powers,

by

by allowing them a free participation with us in our trade to other nations, that they may not be diſpoſed to cramp our trade with themſelves by deſtructive reſtrictions, which, by tending to diſtreſs the *people* in all countries, enfeeble all without producing good to any. Thus ſhould we become a great people, not leſs revered becauſe of our power, than eſteemed becauſe of our beneficence and juſtice.

THE END.